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Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal
and Ethical Issues
By Roger C. Cramton*
INTRODUCTION
For more than fifty years, numerous and massive corporate frauds (e.g.,
National Student Marketing in the 1970s,' OPM in the early 1980s, 2 Lincoln
Savings & Loan during the S & L crisis of the 1980s,3 and the huge BCCI
bank failure and fraud of the 1990s 4) have raised questions concerning a lawyer's
*Roger C. Cramton is the Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell Law School. Com-
ments should be addressed to ¢rccl0cornell.edu>. This Article was initially prepared for a Practicing
Law Institute program, "The Impact of Enron: Regulatory Ethical and Practice Issuesfor Counsel to Issuers,
Underwriters and Financial Intermediaries," New York City, April 25-26, 2002. The Article has benefited
from my continuing work with Susan Koniak on Enron-related topics. I am greatly indebted to Doug
Branson, George Cohen, Chuck DavidowJim Hanks, Mark Sargent, and Chuck Wolfram for extremely
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. The spectacular rise and fall of National Student Marketing Corp. led to charges that lawyers in
two elite firms (New York's White & Case and Chicago's Lord, Bissell & Brook) had aided and abetted
the fraud. Both settled with investors and two accountants were convicted. SEC v. Nat'l Student
Mktg. Corp., 457 F Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK &
ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 104-22, 739-43 (3d ed. 1999) [herein-
after HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON] (reprinting and discussing National Student Marketing and dis-
cussing subsequent SEC proceedings against lawyers who learned that their client's agents violated
securities laws); see also United States v. Natelli, 553 F2d 5 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing the conviction
of one of the two accountants).
2. See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 1, at 304-10. OPM, the largest commercial fraud
at its time, was the most discussed legal ethics case of the 1980s. Fraud claims against banks, ac-
counting firms, and lawyers were subsequently settled for $65 million, of which Singer Hutner's share
was $10 million. Id. at 308; In re O.PM. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 B.R. 64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd,
670 E2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Jan. 9, 1983, at 31 (presenting a detailed expose of the involvement of OPM's lawyers in seeing
to it that their client's fraud went undiscovered until after the total collapse of the pyramid scheme).
3. Jones Day, which resigned from a regulatory compliance representation of Lincoln Savings &
Loan, later settled fraud and other claims of investors for $24 million and government claims against
it for $51 million. See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 1, at 743-56. Kaye Scholer, which
succeeded Jones Day, later settled the government's claim against it for $41 million. Id. at 757. For
discussion of the savings and loan cases, see William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's
Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 243 (1998);
Symposium: The Attorney-Client Relationship in a Regulated Society, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 571 (1994); In
the Matter of Kaye, Scholer Fierman, Hays & Handler: A Symposium on Government Regulation, Lawyer's
Ethics, and the Rule of Law, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 977 (1993).
4. See, e.g., DOUGLAS FRANTZ & DAvID MCKEAN, FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES 285-400 (1995) (dis-
cussing Clark Clifford's role in the BCCI failure); JONATHAN BEATY & S. C. GWYNNE, THE OUTLAW
BANK: A WILD RIDE INTO THE SECRET HEART OF BCCI (1993).
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responsibilities when the lawyer learns, or has reason to know, that officers or
other agents of the lawyer's corporate client are engaged in conduct that violates
the law or their fiduciary duty to the corporation and is likely to result in harm
to the corporation, shareholders or other third parties. In each of these situations,
and in hundreds of less-publicized frauds, outside law firms settled civil liability
actions for substantial and sometimes huge sums, while denying that they had
assisted or participated in the fraud. Similar lawsuits have already been brought
against two law firms involved in the Enron affair, Vinson & Elkins ("V&E") and
Kirkland & Ellis ("K&E")5 and others are likely to follow.
The Enron affair and the flood of other recent corporate scandals (e.g., Adel-
phia, Arthur Andersen [hereinafter "Andersen"], Dynergy, Global Crossing, Tyco,
WorldCom, Xerox) have led to a loss of investor and public confidence in the
integrity of the securities and other markets that make American capitalism work.
Investors have lost confidence in the reliability and honesty of corporate execu-
tives. Andersen's indictment and conviction for obstruction of justice highlighted
the role of accountants in structuring and auditing corporate transactions that
turned out to be fraudulent or illegal. But compliant lawyers as well as greedy
executives, lazy directors and malleable accountants are necessary for large cor-
porate frauds to come to life and persist long enough to cause major harm.6 The
assistance of inside and outside lawyers is required to structure and report on
corporate transactions. Other reforms will not suffice unless lawyers who violate
legal and ethical rules are held accountable.
The premises of this Article are well stated in the recent preliminary report of
the American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force on Corporate Responsibility: Even
if most corporate officers, directors and professional advisers act honestly and in
good faith, the interests of corporate managers are not fully aligned with those of
shareholders.7 As the Preliminary Report states,
[E]xecutive officers and other employees of public companies may suc-
cumb to the temptation to serve personal interests in maximizing their own
wealth or control at the expense of long-term corporate well-being ...
[I] ndependent participants in the corporate governance process, such as the
outside directors, outside auditors, and outside counsel [are essential to
check such temptation]. [Elvidenced by recent failures of corporate responsibility,
the exercise by such independent participants of active and informed stewardship
of the best interests of the corporation has in too many instances fallen short.
Unless the governance system is changed in ways designed to encourage
5. Amended Complaint, Newby v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3624 (S.D. Tex. filed Apr. 8, 2002).
6. See Susan R Koniak, Who Gave Lawyers a Pass? We Haven't Blamed the Real Culprits in Corporate
Scandals, FORBES MAG., Aug. 12, 2002, at 58 ("The dirty secret of the mess is that without lawyers
few scandals would exist, and fewer still would last long enough to cause any real harm.").
7. ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 58 Bus. LAw. 189 (2002) [hereinafter ABA Preliminary Report[;
see also Joan C. Rogers & Rachel McTague, SEC Must Issue Attorney Conduct Rules Under New Federal
Accounting Reform Law, 18 LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 457-58 (July 31, 2002)
(reporting and summarizing section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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such active and informed stewardship, . . . public trust and investor confi-
dence in the corporate governance system will not be restored.,
Part I of this Article examines the current legal and ethical rules that govern
lawyers in client-fraud situations. Part I concludes that these rules are contro-
verted, often ambiguous and provide insufficient guidance to lawyers and in-
adequate protection to the public interest in preventing corporate frauds
and illegalities.
Part II illustrates the theses of Part I by applying the current rules to three
problems that regularly arise when managers breach their fiduciary duties to the
corporation or embark on fraudulent conduct: (1) advising a corporate client
concerning retention of documents and other relevant evidence when it becomes
clear that litigation is likely or impending; (2) conducting an internal investigation
of allegations that one or more corporate managers have engaged in misconduct;
and (3) providing legal assistance in creating, documenting, and reporting client
transactions that raise substantial legal problems (primarily securities fraud is-
sues). The complexity and difficulty of these recurring problems are revealed by
examining the known facts concerning (1) the advice given Andersen by its inside
lawyers, (2) the conduct of V&E's "preliminary investigation" of Sherron Watkins'
allegations of misconduct by some Enron managers, and (3) V&E's role in creating
and reporting the corporate transactions that appear to be fraudulent and led to
Enron's demise.
Part III argues that the problems we now face are systemic in character and not
merely a problem of a few executives, auditors, and lawyers who are "bad apples."
The inadequacy of the current rules governing lawyers requires that existing rules
be clarified and some new ones created. The federal legislation that has already
occurred, with its provision for a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule
requiring lawyers to report illegalities to superior officers and the corporate board,
is a sound beginning, 9 but more is required, especially the overruling of the
Central Bank decision eliminating any claim against professional advisers for
aiding and abetting a securities fraud. 10 In addition, state high courts should
modify their ethics rules along the lines recommended in the ABA Task Force
Preliminary Report."1
ANALYSIS OF THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL ISSUES
What is or should be the role of the corporate lawyer, inside or outside the
client corporation, when faced with a client fraud situation? What ethics and
liability rules should govern the situation?
8. ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 193-94 (emphasis in original).
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784. See discussion
in text beginning infra note 144.
10. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). See dis-
cussion infra notes 44 and 121-23 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
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The problems are complex ones that turn on factual and legal issues including
the following: (1) When and what did the lawyer know at the time of action or
non-action?; (2) What scienter (intent) standard should be applied to the lawyer's
conduct?; (3) Does a lawyer who learns of facts or circumstances suggesting pos-
sible fraud have a duty to inquire further?; (4) When the lawyer knows, or has
reason to know, that officers of his corporate client are pursuing a fraudulent
course of conduct, should or must the lawyer take this information to the client's
highest authority, the board of directors?; and (5) If the officers and the board refuse
to cease or rectify what the lawyer believes is fraudulent conduct, may or must the
lawyer disclose this information to defrauded third parties or a public officer?
FINDING OR ASSUMING THE RELEVANT FACTS
The initial problems are primarily factual in character.
First, what was the lawyer retained to do by the corporate client (including
agreed-upon limits on the scope of representation) and what did the lawyer do?
Are the limitations so severe that the lawyer is unable to provide the competent
and adequate representation required by ethics rules?12
Second, what did the corporate agents do, a purely factual question, and did
their actions constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to the organization, a crime or
intentional tort that might be imputed to the corporation, or a fraud or other
illegality harming third persons (investors, shareholders, creditors, etc.)?
Third, what did the lawyer know, or have reason to know, at the time the lawyer
acted or failed to act? The lawyer's conduct should not be judged on the basis of
facts learned at a later time. After the dust has settled, and with the benefit of
hindsight, it is easier to conclude that corporate managers were engaged in fraud-
ulent conduct that was harmful to third persons and the corporate client. But a
judgment based on later-discovered facts is unfair and unlawful.
In representing clients in the vicinity of fraudulent or suspected fraudulent
activity, lawyers should bear in mind several fundamental cautions.
First, an innocent state of mind will not save a lawyer from responsibility or
liability Because lawyers convince themselves that they do not "know" that fraud
is going on, often ignoring what is plain to see, they believe they are safe from
liability. They will not, however, be judged by their recollection of their state of
mind. The fact finders who will judge lawyers cannot read their minds and are
likely to be skeptical about what the lawyers say they believed and thought.
Lawyers will be judged by the facts and circumstances, known or which they had
reason to know at the time, that surrounded their actions and what they did in
response to those facts and circumstances.
12. A lawyer owes every client a duty of "competent representation," a requirement that can never
be waived by the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002). Although Rule 1.2(c) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct permits a lawyer to "limit the scope of the representation if
the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent[,]" the
client may not be asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as to violate Rule 1.1. Id. R. 1.2
cmt. 7.
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Second, one of the grave risks professional advisers face is the "hindsight bias":
the tendency of all human beings to exaggerate the extent to which an event that
they know has happened could have been anticipated in advance. 13 Any subse-
quent fact-finding of whether a lawyer knew of and assisted a client's fraudulent
conduct almost always arises after bankruptcy or other events have revealed that
a fraud occurred. While a lawyer should not be held to have known at the time
of action or inaction facts that only became known later, those facts will inevitably
color a fact-finder's retrospective judgment. The hindsight bias, in the civil fraud
context, makes defendants appear more culpable than they may be. Lawyers,
knowing that this will happen, should exercise greater caution than they often do
when dealing with a client that is pushing the law to its limits and perhaps beyond.
Liability problems always start with clients whose managers are not trustworthy
or who create a corporate culture in which short-term goals are the only goals.
Caution in selecting and retaining such clients is essential, as well as healthy
skepticism concerning their actions and motives.
Third, lawyers cannot rely on the attorney-client privilege to protect them. The
privilege belongs to the entity client, not the lawyer. Major frauds that become
publicly known usually result in bankruptcy or change in control of the client
corporation. The trustee in bankruptcy or other successor in interest typically
waives the attorney-client privilege and the professional duty of confidentiality
Every law firm document or communication relating to the representation be-
comes available to the corporation in a malpractice action against the law firm
and to plaintiffs' lawyers in third-party liability actions. Even if the privilege is not
waived, other doctrines usually lead to many or most documents becoming avail-
able. For example, under the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, a prima facie
showing of client fraud penetrates the privilege; 14 under the Garner doctrine, a
shareholder plaintiff in a derivative suit may obtain otherwise privileged material
relating to a plausible derivative claim. 5
A complete factual story of lawyer conduct in the Enron affair is not available
as of November 2002 when this Article was completed and may never be fully
available. Consequently, my discussion of ethical and legal issues must be based
on assumed facts. I will operate on a factual assumption, not yet established but
clearly plausible, that Andrew Fastow and perhaps other managers of Enron were
engaged in a course of conduct that was fraudulent and perhaps criminal: using
unlawful means to make Enron's financial position appear much better than in
13. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 571 (1998) (stating that the hindsight bias is one of the best-established findings of cognitive
psychology and examining its implications on fact-finders' decisions). A lawyer's "level of care will be
reviewed by a judge or jury who already knows that it proved inadequate to avoid the plaintiff's injury.
... The bias, in general, makes defendants appear more culpable than they really are." Id. at 572
(footnotes omitted).
14. See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 1, at 244-54. As Justice Cardozo said, "[tihe
privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will
serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law." Clark v. United States, 289
U.S. 1, 15 (1933); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1063-64 (1978).
15. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 E2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970).
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fact it was, while violating their fiduciary duty to Enron by misappropriating for
themselves huge sums of money from self-dealing transactions. This factual as-
sumption is supported by the report of Enron's special board investigative com-
mittee headed by William Powers,1 6 the guilty plea of Michael Kopper,"7 and the
first interim report of the examiner appointed by Enron's bankruptcy court. 8
I also assume for purposes of this Article that certain publicly available facts
are true: first, the admissions concerning document destruction made by Ander-
sen officials in congressional testimony and, as to his personal conduct, Duncan's
guilty plea; second, the facts concerning V&E's representation of Enron included
in the Powers Report 9 and, in connection with V&E's "preliminary investigation"
of Enron, the facts stated in V&E's opinion letter to Enron of October 15, 2001,20
and the firm's narrative summaries of interviews conducted. 2'
WHAT SCIENTER (INTENT) STANDARD SHOULD BE APPLIED TO
THE LAWYER'S CONDUCT?
Should the lawyer's conduct be judged by an "actual knowledge" standard or
by the "recklessness" and "willful blindness" standards that are generally appli-
cable to lay persons? This raises the question of why lawyers, who are supposedly
experienced and knowledgeable about corporate transactions and the elements
of illegality and fraud, should be afforded a less demanding scienter standard in
professional discipline cases and SEC aiding and abetting proceedings than the
standard that lay persons must meet to avoid criminal and civil liability
16. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (2002) 1hereinafter POWERS REPORT], avail-
able at 2002 WL 198018.
17. On August 21, 2002, Kopper pled guilty to money laundering and wire fraud charges. His plea
agreement described a criminal conspiracy running from 1997 through July 2001, in which Kopper,
Fastow, and unnamed others used a series of Enron-related partnerships to conceal debt, falsify Enron's
financial position, and make millions for the conspirators at Enron's expense. See Jonathan Weil et
al., Guilty Plea by Enron's Kopper Increases Scrutiny of Ex-CFO, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2002, at Al.
18. In re Enron Corp., First Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, No. 01-
16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002) [hereinafter BOSTONI, available at 2002 WL 31113331.
In the report, the examiner analyzes six series of Enron transactions involving special purpose entities
(SPEs) selected for their representative character. In each of the transactions Enron purported to sell
an asset to an SPE in exchange for cash provided almost entirely by a financial institution. In four of
the six transactions Enron or its affiliate entered into a "total return swap" under which Enron was
obligated to repay the investment plus a specified return on it. The transactions were supported by
Enron's credit because the assets were difficult to sell and produced insufficient cash flow to support
the financing. Enron retained control of the assets and the benefit or loss of their rise or fall in value.
The examiner's interim conclusions were that: (1) although documented as sales and usually supported
by "true sale opinions" provided by Enron's outside lawyers, the transactions were in fact loans,
(2) Enron's obligations under the total return swaps were not properly disclosed in Enron's 2000 fi-
nancial statements as required by GAAP, and (3) the transactions and their reporting "had dramaticeffects
on both the balance sheet and income statement portions of Enron's financial statements." Id. at *7-*8.
19. See POWERS REPORT, supra note 16, at *15.
20. Opinion Letter from Max Hendrick III, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.R, to James V Derrick, Jr., Ex-
ecutive Vice President and General Counsel, Enron Corp. (Oct. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Hendrick
Opinion Letter], available at 2001 WL 1764266.
21. These interview summaries may be found at the Web site of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce [hereinafter V&E Interview Narratives], at http://energycommerce.house.gov.
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The profession's ethics rules, designed for purposes of professional discipline,
adopt an "actual knowledge" standard. Rule 1.2(d) of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Rules of Professional Conduct,2 2 dealing with prohibited assistance,
states that the lawyer "shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .... 23 "Knows" is defined
in the terminology section as "actual knowledge of the fact in question[,L" but
adds that "[a] person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. '24 "Fraud"
is defined as "conduct... [having] a purpose to deceive" and not merely negligent
misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information. 25 These
definitions provide greater protection to lawyers in discipline proceedings than
other law provides them in other contexts. The definitions create a risk of mis-
leading lawyers concerning the standards by which they will be judged in client
fraud situations.
26
Federal and state laws dealing with fraud and various deceptive practices gen-
erally adopt or are interpreted as embodying a less demanding standard of knowl-
edge of culpable conduct than that of the ABA Model Rules: a lawyer cannot state
facts with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity; nor can the lawyer turn a
blind eye to facts and circumstances that indicate fraud or illegality-conduct that
falls within the "willful blindness" rubric.
Scienter under the federal securities acts may be summarized as follows:
(1) Criminal liability. The defendant must be proven to have acted "willfully,"
that is, with a culpable state of mind.27 The defendant's knowledge of false state-
ments, however, may be inferred "from the actor's special situation and continuity
of conduct"28 and "the cumulation of instances, each explicable only by extreme
credulity or professional inexpertness, may have a probative force immensely
greater than any one of them alone.' '29 The court in United States v. Benjamin stated,
"the Government can meet its burden [in a securities fraud prosecution] by prov-
ing that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had a duty to see or
22. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, first adopted by the ABA in 1983, with subsequent
amendments, provide the framework for the legal ethics rules of forty-three U.S. jurisdictions. The
rules have also been influential in the eight states that base their rules on the 1969 ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility The Model Rules were substantially amended in February 2002, but
the many changes have little effect on the issues discussed in this Article. For the amended rules, see
the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Web site, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
mrpc_toc.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002) (emphasis added).
24. Id. R. 1.0(f).
25. Id. R. 1.0(d).
26. The ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 207, recognizes that the Model Rules' restriction
to a lawyer's "knowing" conduct "presumably does not reach conduct covered by the term 'reasonably
should know.'" The Report recommends revision of Rules 1.2(d), 1.13, and 4.1 "to reach beyond
actual knowledge to circumstances in which the lawyer reasonably should know of the crime or fraud."
Id. at 214. These changes, if adopted, would conform the Rules' definition of fraudulent intent to
federal and state law governing the subject.
27. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1964) (affirming the criminal convictions
of an accountant and a lawyer for securities and mail fraud).
28. Id. (quoting Bentel v. United States, 13 E2d 327, 329 (2d Cir. 1926)).
29. Id. at 862 (quoting United States v. White, 124 F2d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1941)).
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recklessly stated as facts things of which he was ignorant."30 As Judge Friendly
put it:
In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion
can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel
or the crowbar. Of course, Congress did not mean that any mistake of law
or misstatement of fact should subject an attorney or an accountant to crim-
inal liability simply because more skillful practitioners would not have made
them. But Congress equally could not have intended that men holding them-
selves out as members of these ancient professions should be able to escape
criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut their eyes to
what was plainly to be seen or have represented a knowledge they knew
they did not possess. 31
(2) Civil liability under securities acts. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,32 the
Supreme Court found that "[elach of the provisions of the 1934 Act that ex-
pressly create civil liability [including § 10(b)] . . .contains a state-of-mind con-
dition requiring something more than negligence." 33 The required scienter in-
cludes a mental state embracing "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"
34
and may be shown by "knowing or intentional misconduct. '35 The Hochfelder
case was extended in Santa Fe Industries v. Green36 and Cort v. Ash, 37 which held
that state law governs questions involving the fairness of transactions or internal
corporate mismanagement "except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders .... -31 Thus allegations
of breach of fiduciary duty alone will not suffice; fraudulent or deceptive con-
duct must be alleged.
Hochfelder and Aaron left open the question whether allegations of "reckless-
ness" satisfy the scienter requirement. The federal courts of appeals, however,
have almost uniformly concluded that the recklessness and "willful blindness"
sufficient for criminal liability also suffice for civil liability Under the most com-
mon standard, recklessness means conduct that is "highly unreasonable" and that
represents "an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care ... [to the
30. Id. at 862 (summarizing the holding of two prior decisions) (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 863.
32. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
33. Id. at 209 n.28. In Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980), in which the SEC sought injunctive
relief for a securities violation, the Court held that "scienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought."
34. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193.
35. Id. at 197.
36. 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (stating that a shareholder's claim under section 10(b) that his shares
were undervalued in a merger transaction, but not alleging a misrepresentation, was insufficient be-
cause the statutory language and legislative history gave "no indication that Congress meant to prohibit
any conduct not involving manipulation or deception").
37. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
38. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
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extent that the] danger ... [was] either known to the defendant or [was] so
obvious that the [defendant] must have been aware of it."39
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("1995 Act") imposes
special pleading requirements on civil plaintiffs in securities fraud actions.40 The
complaint must "specify each statement alleged to have been misleading," provide
"reasons why the statement is misleading," and "state with particularity all facts
on which [a belief that a statement is misleading] is formed."41 Concerning proof
of the required state of mind, the complaint must, with respect to each act or
omission, "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind. '"42
(3) Assisting a client's crime or fraud. A lawyer's duty under criminal and civil
law to refrain from "assisting" (aiding or abetting) a client in conduct that is
"criminal" or "fraudulent" is violated if:
(1) The client is engaged in a course of conduct that violates the criminal
law or is an intentional violation of a civil obligation, other than failure
to perform a contract or failure to sustain a good faith claim to property;
(2) The lawyer has knowledge of the facts sufficient to reasonably discern
that the client's course of conduct is such a violation; and
(3) The lawyer facilitates the client's course of conduct either by giving ad-
vice that encourages the client to pursue the conduct or indicates how
to reduce the risks of detection, or by performing an act that substantially
furthers the course of conduct.
43
The effect of the holding in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver,44 eliminating private causes of action for aiding and abetting federal se-
curities laws violations, is to force private plaintiffs to charge defendants as pri-
mary violators (principals) rather than secondary ones. In some situations, an
alternative course of action is to proceed under state securities or fraud laws that
permit aiding and abetting claims.45
39. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc decision fre-
quently cited in other circuits). Decisions in a few circuits support an arguably more relaxed standard
of something more than negligence. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 E2d 1277, 1306 n.98 (2d
Cir. 1973) (en banc) (finding that reckless conduct exists if the defendant, knowing that material facts
were omitted or misstated, failed to obtain and disclose such facts when doing so could be done
without extraordinary effort); see generally Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations
and Omissions Under Section I0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 667 (1991).
40. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 21D(b), 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 and
18 U.S.C. § 1964).
41. § 21D(b)(1)(B), 109 Stat. at 747.
42. § 21D(b)(2), 109 Stat. at 747.
43. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful
Conduct?, 35 U. MiAmi L. REv. 669, 682-83 (1981).
44. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). The Central Bank case is discussed infra at notes 121-23 and accompa-
nying text.
45. A plaintiff's resort to state securities laws must take account of the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, which "preempted state statutory and
common law securities fraud claims by requiring class actions involving nationally traded securities
to be brought exclusively in federal court under uniform federal standards." Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of
Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1293, 1295-96 (1999).
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(4) SEC aiding and abetting actions against professional advisers. The 1995 Act
authorizes the SEC to bring actions for injunctions and monetary penalties against
any person, including a professional adviser, who "knowingly provides substantial
assistance to another person in violation" of federal securities laws. 46 The statute
substitutes an actual knowledge standard for the "recklessness" standard that gov-
erns civil liability of primary offenders under section 10(b) and criminal liability
of all actors for aiding and abetting.47
A DUTY OF INQUIRY?
When the lawyer learns facts that, if true, strongly suggest that a corporate
officer has engaged in illegal or fraudulent conduct, what should or must the
lawyer do? Probably the most unsettled and controverted question is whether a
lawyer must investigate suspicious circumstances that suggest fraud or follow up
on specific allegations of fraud. There is very little direct precedent. A few federal
cases hold that inquiry is required under some circumstances:
The O'Melveny case. In FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers,45 the receiver of a failed
thrift was held to have stated a claim for relief against a law firm that had assisted
the thrift in two real estate syndications offered to investors. When the private
placement was made, the thrift was in unsound financial condition; its officers
had fraudulently overvalued assets, embezzled funds, and generally "cooked the
books." The complaint alleged that O'Melveny, knowing of the recent resignations
of the thrift's prior auditors and outside law firm, did not question the auditors,
the law firm, federal or state regulators, or the thrift's financial officer about the
thrift's financial status before giving legal opinions and doing other work that
assisted the thrift in soliciting investors. After the thrift failed, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), acting as conservator, rescinded the investments
and was assigned the investors' claims against O'Melveny The receiver then
brought suit against O'Melveny for professional negligence (malpractice) and neg-
ligent misrepresentation (third-party liability). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, held that these
allegations stated claims for relief.4 9 O'Melveny holds that the recent resignations
of the issuer's prior auditor and lawyer were suspicious circumstances, known to
the lawyer, that required further inquiry. 0 The duty of due care owed to both the
investors and the client required a "reasonable, independent investigation" of the
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000).
47. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
48. 969 E2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), reaf-
firmed on remand, 61 E3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court based its reversal on a concern that
the initial decision was grounded on a federal common law ruling that the FDIC was not bound by
certain equitable defenses that could have been raised by the bank, O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 E2d at
752; on remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that its initial decision was
based, as it should have been, on California and not federal law, O'Melveny & Meyers, 512 U.S. at 89.
49. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F2d at 752.
50. Id. at 749.
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client's financial status before giving legal opinions and assisting the client in
soliciting investors.5"
The Clark case. In FDIC v. Clark,5 1 the receiver of a failed bank sued the bank's
outside counsel for failing to investigate claims made in a civil lawsuit against the
bank that alleged that the bank's president had conspired to defraud the bank of
several million dollars through a fraudulent loan scheme. The lawyers accepted
the president's explanation of the situation and failed to inquire further or to
inform the board of directors of the allegations. The court upheld a jury verdict
against the lawyers, stating that "there was ample proof for the jury to find that
defendants were negligent in their professional duties to the bank, and that their
negligence was a cause of loss" to the bank. 53
The Schatz case. Some decisions, however, take a "no duty" approach in the
third-party liability context as distinct from the malpractice context. Schatz v.
Rosenberg54 is the most vivid and notorious example of a case holding that a lawyer
has no duty to correct client misrepresentations to third persons before closing a
transaction with the defrauded person.55 The plaintiffs alleged that the lawyer,
aware that the client's financial situation had deteriorated, forwarded the client's
false financial statement to the person buying the client's business and taking in
return an unsecured note for a portion of the purchase price. When the client
filed for bankruptcy, the purchasers suffered financial loss. The court affirmed
dismissal of counts charging the firm with liability as an aider and abettor under
federal securities law and Maryland tort law. The court held, agreeing with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, that "lawyers have no duty to
disclose information about clients to third party purchasers or investors in the
absence of a confidential relationship between the attorney and the third party"''56
When the lawyer merely documents the transaction and does not himself make
representations to the third party or provide a legal opinion that does so, the
lawyer is not liable even though ordinary agency law (applicable to agents of
sellers generally) would impose liability57 Schatz and other cases apply a lower
standard of conduct to lawyers negotiating and preparing documents for a client
transaction than would be applied to a used-car salesman acting for his principal.
Some ethics opinions discuss situations in which a lawyer must either make
further inquiry or decline to provide an opinion or service. The ABA Preliminary
Report states that a lawyer who uncritically accepts management's instructions
and limits advice or services to a narrowly defined scope, "ignoring the context
51. Id. (quoting Felts v. Nat'l Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F Supp. 54, 67 (N.D. Miss. 1978)).
52. 978 E2d 1541 (loth Cir. 1992).
53. Id. at 1551.
54. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
55. Id. at 492.
56. Id. at 490 (footnote omitted).
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 (1958). "An agent who fraudulently makes rep-
resentations, ... or knowingly assists in the commission of tortious fraud ... by his principal ... is
subject to liability in tort to the injured person although the fraud.., occurs in a transaction on behalf
of the principal." Id.
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or implications of the advice they are giving[,I" may violate obligations owed to
the corporate client and the public. 8 The Report also states: "The ABA has long
advised that lawyers providing transactional opinions that may be relied upon by
third parties cannot blindly accept facts posited by the client; they must question
and investigate the factual predicate for their advice, at least to some extent and
in some circumstances. '"5 9
CLIMBING THE CORPORATE LADDER
If a lawyer learns, or has reason to know, of prospective or ongoing fraud on
the part of the corporation's managers and they refuse to cease or rectify their
course of conduct, should the lawyer take the problem to the corporation's highest
authority, usually the board of directors? Is "loyal disclosure," that is, disclosure
of client confidences within the client entity, different than disclosure outside the
organization (e.g., whistleblowing to the SEC, persons thought to be harmed, or
the press)?
Model Rule 1.13(b), addressing the situation in which an organization's lawyer
"knows" that an agent is engaged in conduct in violation of fiduciary duties to
the organization or in law violations harmful to the organization, states that a
lawyer "shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the orga-
nization. ' 60 Although the Rule does not explicitly require an organization's lawyer
to take a problem up the corporate ladder, that response, I believe, is required in
58. ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 207 (citing and quoting from ABA ethics opinions
directed at lawyers who provide tax opinions "on hypothetical facts in circumstances in which the
opinions served to facilitate fraudulent transactions"). E.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Respon-
sibility, Formal Op. 346, 68 A.B.A. J. 471 (1982).
59. ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 208 n.49. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Respon-
sibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974) (quoted in ABA Formal Op. No. 346, supra note 58, at 472) explains
the lawyer's duty to investigate:
[Tihe lawyer should, in the first instance, make inquiry of his client as to the relevant facts and
receive answers. If any of the alleged facts, or the alleged facts taken as a whole, are incomplete
in a material respect, or are suspect, or are inconsistent, or either on their face or on the basis of
other known facts are open to question, the lawyer should make further inquiry. The extent of
this inquiry will depend in each case upon the circumstances. For example, it would be less
where the lawyer's past relationship with the client is sufficient to give him a basis for trusting
the client's probity than where the client has recently engaged the lawyer, and less where the
lawyer's inquiries are answered fully than when there appears a reluctance to disclose information.
Where the lawyer concludes that further inquiry of a reasonable nature would not give him
sufficient confidence as to all the relevant facts, or for any other reason he does not make the
appropriate further inquiries, he should refuse to give an opinion. However, assuming that the
alleged facts are not incomplete in a material respect, or suspect, or in any way inherently
inconsistent, or on their face or on the basis of other known facts open to question, the lawyer
may properly assume that the facts as related to him by his client, and checked by him by
reviewing such appropriate documents as are available, are accurate....
The essence of this opinion ... is that, while a lawyer should make adequate preparation
including inquiry into the relevant facts that is consistent with the above guidelines, and while
he should not accept as true that which he should not reasonably believe to be true, he does not
have the responsibility to "audit" the affairs of his client or to assume, without reasonable cause,
that a client's statement of the facts cannot be relied upon.
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2002).
HeinOnline -- 58 Bus. Law.  154 2002-2003
Enron and the Corporate Lawyer 155
circumstances in which that action is the only one that is in the "best interest of
the organization." The Rule, however, is ambiguous. It recites a number of factors
a lawyer should consider and then lists three measures, including going up the
corporate ladder to the board of directors, that the lawyer "may" take, along with
other unspecified measures. Many lawyers view the provision only as giving the
lawyer discretion to choose among a number of options, including doing nothing
at all, an interpretation that creates a clear risk of liability.
61
The uncertainty on this question is a continuing problem. Many lawyers may
not realize that a lawyer who fails to take effective steps to prevent the harm is
exposed to the risk of civil liability In the case against Jones Day arising out of
its representation of Lincoln Savings & Loan, the court, denying the law firm's
motion for summary judgment, stated that "where a law firm believes the man-
agement of a corporate client is committing serious regulatory violations, the firm
has an obligation to ... urge cessation of the activity" 62 Failure to go to the board
of directors could not be excused because thought to be "futile."
Why isn't it always in the best interests of the corporation for fraud to be
reported up the ladder as high as necessary?63 "Loyal disclosure" within the hi-
erarchy of an entity client protects the client from disloyal managers and furthers
the diligence and loyalty of the lawyer to the interests of the organization itself.
As one commentator noted, "[h]onest corporate officers intent on complying with
legal requirements, who are certainly the vast majority, should welcome the en-
hanced vigilance and protection from their legal counsel.
64
The ABA Preliminary Report reaches the same conclusion: "When the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know [that a corporate 'officer or employee is acting
illegally or fraudulently, or in breach of a duty to the corporation,'] the lawyer
should be encouraged to act promptly to protect the interests of the corpora-
tion."6 The Preliminary Report recommends that Rule 1.13
61. The ABA Preliminary Report criticizes the current text of Model Rule 1.13 and its comments
on additional grounds. The tone of the Rule and its comments "tends to discourage action by the
lawyer to prevent or rectify corporate misconduct" by giving large emphasis to the avoidance of
"disruption" of the organization and requiring the lawyer to have "[cilear justification ... for seeking
review over the head of the constituent normally responsible . ... " ABA Preliminary Report, supra
note 7, at 203-04. In addition, the current rule requires that the matter be "related to the lawyer's
representation" while it should include any matter "that has come to the lawyer's attention through
the representation." Id.
62. In re Am. Cont'l/Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 E Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. Ariz. 1992); see
also FDIC v. Clark, 978 E2d 1541 (10th Cir. 1992) (dismissing law firm's motion for summary
judgment when lawyer failed to take allegations of officer misconduct to the board of directors).
63. See Richard W Painter, Obliging Lawyers to Report Acts of Organizational Clients, PROF. LAw.,
Spring 1998, at 10 (arguing that lawyers should be required by ethics rules and SEC regulation to
climb the corporate ladder to prevent a prospective or ongoing fraud by managers of the corporate
client).
64. George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm
to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597,
653 (1998); see also 1 GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR. & W WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.13.111 (2d ed., 1998 Supp.) (arguing
that the present form of Model Rule 1.13 provides less protection to clients than it would if it required
resort to the entity's highest authority).
65. ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 204.
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be amended to make clear that it requires the lawyer to pursue the measures
outlined in Rule 1.13(c)(1) through (3) (including referring the matter to
higher corporate authority), in a matter either related to the lawyer's repre-
sentation (as currently provided) or that has come to the lawyer's attention
through the representation, where the misconduct by a corporate officer,
employee or agent involves crime or fraud, including violations of federal
securities laws and regulations. 66
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act67 has changed the legal landscape on
this question. Lawyers representing public companies will be required to report
to higher authority within the organization when they have credible evidence of
a material violation of the federal securities laws or of a breach of fiduciary duty
by the company or any of its agents. The recommendations of Richard Painter
and the ABA Task Force will have been put in place in somewhat different form
by an SEC rule promulgated as required by the Act.
The practical problem, especially for inside counsel, is that of angering the
person within the organization with the power to fire the lawyer. That person
may be part of the problem. Tough choices, but who said that being an honorable
lawyer was an easy job? Corporate lawyers are paid $200 to $700 per hour for a
good reason-they deal with difficult and complex matters that require specialized
knowledge, excellent professional skills and, most of all, good judgment.
DISCLOSURE ADVERSE TO A CLIENT'S INTEREST
As a last resort, when a client's officers and board have refused to cease or
rectify a corporate fraud on third parties, should the corporation's lawyer become
a whistleblower? Should rules of professional ethics or regulatory law permit (or
require) the lawyer to disclose confidential information outside the organization
when the managers and the board refuse to cease or rectify the ongoing fraud? If
the black letter of ABA Model Rule 1.6 is taken to mean what it says, a lawyer is
forbidden from disclosing confidential information either to prevent or rectify
client fraud on a third person, even when the lawyer learns of the fraud and it
involves the use of the lawyer's services. Buried in the comments, and inconsistent
with the black-letter text of the Rule, is language permitting a lawyer to "disaffirm
documents"-such as legal opinions prepared for a client-"that are being, or will
be, used in furtherance of the fraud, even though such a 'noisy' withdrawal may
have the collateral effect of inferentially revealing client confidences." 68 The ABA
opinion just quoted infers this permission to reveal confidential information from
Rule 1.2(d), prohibiting a lawyer from assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent
conduct, and Rule 1. 16(a)(1), requiring a lawyer to withdraw when the client will
use the lawyer's services to further a crime or fraud. In addition, the self-defense
exception of Rule 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure when a lawyer's representation is
66. Id.
67. See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
68. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Pro'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992) (discussing a lawyer's
duties in client fraud situations, including the possibility of a "noisy" withdrawal).
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attacked. In the few jurisdictions which have followed the ABA's lead on excep-
tions to the professional duty of confidentiality, a "noisy" withdrawal in some
client fraud situations is possible despite its omission in the black-letter text of
the Rule-and may be necessary to avoid civil liability.
The vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions, however, have not adopted Model Rule
1.6 as recommended by the ABA. Forty-one states permit a lawyer to disclose
confidential information to prevent a client's criminal fraud; four of those states
require a lawyer to make such a disclosure; and only nine states and the District
of Columbia may be viewed as forbidding a lawyer to reveal such information.
69
In the forty-one states that permit or require a lawyer to reveal information to
prevent a criminal fraud, Rule 4.1(b) has additional bite. Because disclosure is
not prohibited, a lawyer must "not knowingly ... fail to disclose a material [fact
to a third person] when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client ... [," effectively creating an affirmative duty of disclo-
sure in those situations.70
During the 1970s the SEC made some noises suggesting that it might adopt a
rule or decisional standard that would require a lawyer to disclose a client's se-
curities violations to the SEC. In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,71 the
SEC took the position that lawyers, knowing that their client had gone ahead
with a merger on the basis of materially misleading financial information in the
shareholder proxy statements, had a duty to prevent the merger from taking place;
the court agreed that the lawyers had aided and abetted the securities fraud but
was much more vague about what the lawyers should have done and imposed
no sanction on them. Faced by a storm of professional outrage, the SEC took a
considerably more modest position in In re Carter & Johnson:
7 2
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a com-
pany's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a substantial and continuing
failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued participation
violates professional standards unless he takes prompt steps to end [his]
client's noncompliance. 
3
In a later case, In re Gutfreund,74 the SEC held that Feuerstein, Salomon's chief
legal officer, knowing that a Salomon trader had submitted false bids on Treasury
securities, was "obligated to take affirmative steps to ensure" that the misconduct
69. See Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., Ethics Rules on Client Confidences (2001), re-
printed in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND OTHER SELECTED STANDARDS (2002) 134-144 (tabu-
lating the current law of all U.S. jurisdictions on disclosure of confidential information to prevent
harm to third persons).
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2002).
71. 457 E Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
72. SEC Release No. 34-17597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,145
(Feb. 28, 1981).
73. Id. at 84,172 (emphasis added).
74. Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554,11992 Transfer Binderi Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,067,
at 83,597 (Dec. 3, 1992).
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was adequately addressed. 7 Those steps might include "disclosure of the matter
to the entity's board of directors, resignation from [the representation], or disclo-
sure to regulatory authorities."7 6 Having raised the specter of disclosure of client
wrongdoing to a public officer, the SEC added that applicable state ethics rules
"may bear upon what course of conduct [the] individual may properly pursue. '77
Under Carter & Johnson and Gutfreund, the lawyer must do something, but
what? The decisions, by their reference to "professional standards" and their em-
phasis on the obligation to withdraw if the client does not cease or rectify the
violation, reflect the ambiguity of the states' ethics rules, which generally give the
lawyer choices but no mandates (other than remonstrating with the client and then
required withdrawal if the client persists in the wrongdoing). At least until Enron,
the SEC, aware of the legal profession's bitter opposition to SEC regulation and
discipline of lawyers, has shown little interest in taking a more aggressive position.
LAWYER CONDUCT IN THE ENRON AFFAIR
ANDERSEN'S DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION
The testimony of Andersen officials to congressional committees, supple-
mented by documents that have subsequently been published and Duncan's
guilty plea, indicates that a massive shredding of Andersen documents relating
to its Enron engagement began on October 23, 2001 and continued for eighteen
days until terminated on November 9, 2001. The shredding damaged Ander-
sen's reputation, placed it in a disastrous liability situation, and led to a criminal
indictment charging the firm with obstruction of justice. The indictment itself
doomed Andersen and the subsequent conviction sealed its fate.78 It is extraor-
dinary that such a massive shredding could have occurred without inside or
outside lawyers providing clear directions that all Enron-related material should
be preserved and establishing procedures to ensure that that occurred. This
single event led to Andersen's disintegration, with horrendous results for its
retired and current employees.
Factual Summary79
After being fined by the SEC and settling a damage action for its conduct
relating to Waste Management's failure and bankruptcy, Andersen revised its
75. Id. at 83,609.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 83,609 n.26.
78. See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2002, at Al (reporting Andersen's conviction on June 15, 2002 of one count of obstructing justice).
79. As indicated earlier, this brief summary of facts relating to Andersen's destruction of Enron-
related documents relies on: (1) testimony of top Andersen officials and Nancy Temple to congressional
committees, especially the hearing of the House Energy & Commerce Committee on January 24,
2002, Destruction of Enron-Related Documents by Andersen Personnel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 30-183 (2002) [here-
inafter Destruction of Enron-Related Documents], available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/
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"document retention policy" The government offered evidence that the policy
statement was motivated at least in part by a desire to ensure that in a future
situation damaging work papers would not be available to regulators and plaintiffs'
lawyers.80 In September and early October 2001, as concern increased within
Andersen about impending scrutiny of its work for Enron, a group of high-level
Andersen partners in Houston and Chicago discussed matters relating to the En-
ron account in meetings and teleconferences. The group included Nancy Temple,
an in-house lawyer in Chicago; Michael Odom, audit practice director; and David
Duncan, the Houston partner in charge of the Enron engagement. During those
conferences, Temple says she asked Duncan, perhaps on more than one occasion,
whether he was in compliance with Andersen's policy dealing with retention and
destruction of documents thereinafter "retention/destruction policy"]. On October
12, Temple sent an e-mail to Odom, which he then forwarded to Duncan. The
e-mail said: "It might be useful to consider reminding the engagement team of our
documentation and retention policy It [would] be helpful to make sure that we
have complied with the policy. Let me know if you have any questions. Nancy"81
Temple also attached a copy of Andersen's retention/destruction policy with
her e-mail. That policy covered systematic destruction of documents, not just
"documentation and retention." When Odom forwarded the e-mail and the policy
to Duncan, he included a note saying, "more help."'8 2 Duncan told the House
committee staff that never before, during his lengthy tenure at Andersen, had he
been asked about compliance with the firm's retention/destruction policy. He
viewed the communications from Temple as inviting him to destroy documents.
On October 21, 2001, Duncan learned that the SEC had, on October 16,
opened an informal inquiry into Enron's financial dealings, particularly the elab-
orate partnership transactions and Enron's fuzzy disclosures of those deals. On
October 22, Duncan and other engagement team members met with Rick Causey,
Enron's chief accounting officer, to discuss the SEC inquiry. The following day,
Duncan called an urgent meeting of the Enron engagement team, at which, ac-
cording to an Andersen executive, "he organized an expedited effort to shred, or
otherwise dispose of, Enron-related documents."8 3 During the next two and one-
half weeks (eighteen days), "a very substantial volume of documents and e-mails
were disposed of by the Enron engagement team. '84
On November 8, 2001, Andersen received an SEC subpoena for Enron-related
documents. Temple, the following day, left a message with Duncan's assistant that
all Enron documents should be preserved. The shredding activity stopped on
action/107-80.pdf; and (2) David Duncan's guilty plea, United States v. Duncan, 2002 WL 534544
(S.D. Tex. 2002). It is confirmed by newspaper reports of the first seven days of the criminal trial
against Andersen. See Jonathan Weil & Alexei Barrioneuvo, In the Balance: As Trial Nears End, Andersen
Case Proves Surprisingly Tough, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at Al (summarizing the first two weeks of
the trial).
80. See Destruction of Enron-Related Documents, supra note 79.
81. Id. at 45.
82. Id. at 148.
83. Id. at 32.
84. Id.
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What were Andersen's lawyers (in-house and outside counsel) doing while
Andersen's accountants and staff were shredding documents? The facts disclosed
thus far suggest three possibilities, none of them good. Andersen's lawyers were
either: (1) encouraging this destruction through none-too-subtle hints; (2) reck-
lessly ignoring the very real possibility that documents might be destroyed by
employees seeking to protect themselves or Andersen; or (3) acting carelessly in
relation to whether the Enron files were preserved or not. Any of these explana-
tions exposed Andersen to civil liability to Enron and its shareholders and resulted
in Andersen's criminal indictment and serious jeopardy
While there is some doubt whether or not knowledge of an SEC investigation
satisfies one element of the general obstruction of justice act,86 it is reasonably
clear that 18 U.S.C. § 1512, discussed below, was violated ly Andersen's destruc-
tion of documents. Section 1512 does not require that a proceeding be pending
or imminent, but only that the defendant has some reasonable basis for under-
standing that a future proceeding is likely or probable.8 7
Duncan was the partner in charge of the Enron account, and federal criminal
law often imputes any wrongdoing on the part of an agent to an entity such as
Andersen. Duncan's plea of guilt satisfies the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1512:
he "knowingly ... engage[d] in misleading conduct toward another person [em-
ployees working under him on the Enron account], with intent to . .. cause or
induce [that] person to-(A) withhold ... a record, document, or other object,
from an official proceeding; [or] (B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object
with intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official
85. Id.
86. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512 (1994). The case law requires that some form of official pro-
ceeding be pending and that the defendant have notice of the proceeding. See United States v. Aguilar,
515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). An SEC informal inquiry initiated on October 16, 2001, which became a
formal inquiry on October 30, 2001, may or may not meet this standard. See United States v. Kelly,
36 F3d 1118, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (summarizing an earlier case dealing with an informal SEC
investigation as holding that "the SEC's authority to issue subpoenas and administer oaths in con-
junction with its investigations made an SEC investigation a § 1505 proceeding").
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512; see also C. Evan Stewart, Andersen: Reviewing Ethics of Document Shredding,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 15, 2002, at 1, 6 (discussing application of ethics rules). See generally, John C. Coffee,
Jr., Criminal Law: The Andersen Fiasco, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 2001, at A19 (concluding that the Andersen
situation meets any of the lower court tests for when a proceeding is sufficient under 18 U.S.C. § 1512,
including the strict one expressed by United States v. Shively, 927 E2d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 1991)). The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, created additional penalties for
document destruction. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 makes it a crime, punishable by a fine and up to five years
imprisonment, to alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal a document with the intent to make it unavailable
in an official proceeding or otherwise obstruct any official proceeding. The Act also creates an addi-
tional crime, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, with the same penalties, to alter, destroy, mutilate, conceal, falsify, or
make a false entry in any document with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation or bankruptcy
case "or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case." Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 802, 116 Stat. 800.
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proceeding[.]""' In addition to the imputed liability for Duncan's conduct, the
government presented evidence in the criminal trial that high-level officials of
Andersen, in its Chicago headquarters, were worried about the availability of
harmful Enron documents to the SEC and plaintiffs' lawyers, and that the requests
to Duncan that his team follow Andersen's retention/destruction policy were an
indirect way to communicate a desire that harmful working papers and e-mails
be destroyed.
In-house lawyer Temple appears to have failed in her duty to advise Andersen
employees that under these circumstances any destruction of Enron documents
would be a federal (and perhaps state) crime. Andersen's retention/destruction
policy was ambiguous and Duncan, a non-lawyer, was left to decipher its com-
peting provisions that, on the one hand, documents that were not essential in
proving that audits were done properly should be destroyed and, on the other,
that documents should not be destroyed in situations involving "litigation" or
perhaps also "threatened litigation."8 9 The clear application of the latter statement
was surely indicated, but that direction never occurred until November 10, 2001,
after the shredding was over.
An outside law firm, Davis, Polk & Wardwell ("Davis Polk"), was also looking
after Andersen's interest during most of the document destruction period. Davis
Polk was retained by Andersen on October 9, 2001, and began work on October
16. Temple has testified that on October 16, 2001 she consulted with Davis Polk
lawyers concerning document retention. We do not know the scope of Davis
Polk's representation of Andersen other than public statements that the firm was
advising Andersen concerning its legal problems relating to the Enron engage-
ment. If in-house counsel had told Davis Polk that it had already taken care of
requiring the preservation of documents, the firm could reasonably rely on that
assurance and devote itself to other matters. Under other scenarios, the firm's
advice or lack thereof may raise questions of adequacy of representation.
This recital makes one thing clear: Some lawyer or lawyers failed to protect
Andersen's interest in preserving all of its Enron-related documents. One of the
initial steps in any internal investigation is the preservation of relevant documents.
There is always a danger that some employees may believe that destruction of
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).
89. The executive summary of Andersen's policy statement stated: "[in cases of threatened litiga-
tion, no related information will be destroyed." Arthur Andersen Business Unit, Enron Corp., Practice
Administration: Client Engagement Information-Organization, Retention and Destruction, Statement No.
760, at *2 (2000), available at 2000 WL 33680396. But the section to which the summary refers, section
4.5.4, provides for document retention when the responsible accountant "is advised of litigation or
subpoenas regarding a particular engagement." Id. at * 10. It is unclear whether the omission of "threat-
ened" in the text of the policy statement was an inadvertent omission or intentional obfuscation. In any
event, the policy statement had to be viewed in the light of state and federal criminal laws, which often
prohibit destruction of relevant documents when litigation is reasonably foreseeable or imminent. Lawyer
Temple claimed in her congressional testimony that her statements were intended to invite Duncan to
read and follow the firm's policy The policy, however, was ambiguous on its face and a careful lawyer
should have applied it to the particular context in the light of applicable criminal prohibitions (e.g.,
federal law and Illinois and Texas law). Application of this relevant law, a matter for a lawyer rather
than an accountant, clearly required the retention of all relevant documents as of October 21.
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troublesome documents will serve their or the company's interest. Preventing such
actions is essential to the company's reputation and, in this case, its very survival.
How could Andersen demonstrate its innocence of participation in Enron's fraud,
assuming it was innocent, when many files had been destroyed after an SEC
inquiry had begun? Without its files, how could it reestablish its reputation by
convincing the public that it had gotten to the bottom of any problem and made
the necessary changes? Why would it want to risk being criminally charged? Many
failures contributed to Andersen's disintegration, but lawyer failure was surely
one of them.
V&E's "PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION" OF
WATKINS' ALLEGATIONS
Factual Background and Assumptions 90
Sherron Watkins' anonymous letter of August 14, 2001, supplemented by sev-
eral later communications in which she identified herself, stated that "Enron has
been very aggressive in its accounting."9' Watkins' allegations raised serious ques-
tions concerning the accounting treatment and economic substance of the LJM
and Raptor transactions, Andrew Fastow's conflicts of interest, and correctly pre-
dicted that negative publicity and litigation would occur when the public learned
about the transactions.
Enron's CEO, Kenneth Lay, met with Watkins on August 22, 2001. After agree-
ing to initiate an investigation, Lay discussed the situation with James V Derrick,
Jr., Enron's general counsel. Lay and Derrick agreed that Enron should retain an
outside law firm to investigate and that V&E, if it could do so ethically, should
conduct the investigation. Lay and Derrick recognized that V&E had done legal
work creating some of the limited partnerships at issue and had advised on the
securities disclosures concerning them. Nevertheless, they concluded that V&E
was in the best position to help Enron determine whether a full-scale investigation
by independent lawyers and accountants was necessary. According to Enron and
V&E, the firm's familiarity with Enron and the transactions would allow it to do
the job quickly, and that explains why V&E was chosen. V&E agreed to do the
investigation and two V&E lawyers (the partner responsible for the Enron rela-
tionship and a litigation partner who had done no prior work for Enron) began
work on the matter on August 23 or 24, 2001.
The scope of V&E's investigation was limited in significant respects. It was a
"preliminary investigation" to determine "whether the [Watkins allegations] ...
presented any new information ... that may warrant further independent inves-
tigation."92 V&E had also agreed with Enron's Derrick and Lay that "our initial
approach would not involve the second guessing of the accounting advice and
90. The documents relied on for this summary of assumed facts are cited supra notes 16, 20, and 21.
91. Letter originally anonymous from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth L. Lay, Chief Excutive
Officer, Enron Corp. 1 (Aug. 14, 2001), available at http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/enron/
empltr2lay82001.pdf.
92. Hendrick Opinion Letter, supra note 20, at *2.
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treatment provided by [Andersen]" and "that there would be no detailed analysis
of each and every transaction. ' 93 In fact, there does not appear to have been a
detailed analysis of any transaction.
During late August and early September 2001, V&E interviewed eight high-
level Enron officials and two Andersen partners (Duncan and Cash), studied doc-
uments relating to the LJM partnerships, met informally with V&E lawyers who
had worked on these matters, and, finally, met with Watkins.9 4 On September 21,
2001, they reported orally to Lay and Derrick; the same conclusions were later
embodied in V&E's October 15 opinion letter.95
V&E's opinion concluded that "the facts disclosed through our preliminary
investigation do not, in our judgment, warrant a further widespread investigation
by independent counsel and auditors.."96 This statement was accompanied by a
statement that "the bad cosmetics involving the LJM entities and Raptor trans-
actions, coupled with the poor performance of the merchant investment assets
placed in those vehicles and the decline in the value of Enron stock" created "a
serious risk of adverse publicity and litigation. '" 97
The following day Enron announced that it was taking a nearly $600 million
charge against earnings and a reduction of shareholders' equity of $1.2 billion
related to Raptor transactions. Investor confidence was undermined, Enron stock
plummeted, credit triggers were set off, and some six weeks later Enron sought
bankruptcy protection.
Ethical and Legal Issues Concerning V&E's Investigation
Should V&E have undertaken an investigation the scope and purpose of which
were unclear? Should V&E have accepted limits on its investigation that restricted
whom it should interview and what it should accept, such as Andersen's resolu-
tion of accounting matters, without further review? Did the investigation require
V&E to evaluate its own prior work? Did V&E provide adequate representation
to Enron in conducting its investigation?
The scope of the intended investigation remains unclear. On its face it was a
very narrow one: to determine whether Watkins' communications advanced any
"new facts" that would justify a full investigation, with all accounting issues left
unexamined. But Watkins raised disclosure and conflicts issues as well as ac-
counting issues; and the investigation actually carried out considered much
broader questions such as the "bad cosmetics" of the accounting actions, the
likelihood of shareholder litigation, and the conflicts of interest raised by the
LJM transactions. While a client's regular lawyer can undertake a narrow inves-
tigation whether "new facts" have been raised, the broader one ("Do we have a
problem here?") suggested by the inquiry actually made, and by the report itself,
93. Id. at *1.
94. PowERs REPORT, supra note 16, at *80.
95. Id.
96. Hendrick Opinion Letter, supra note 20, at *7.
97. Id.
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does involve disclosure issues and V&E's prior work. Moreover, the context
suggests that Lay and Derrick wanted and got an opinion that would be read
to provide cover on the broader question: "There is no problem that deserves a
full investigation."
Under the profession's conflict of interest rules, a lawyer may not represent a
client if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client
would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interest, unless
the client gives a fully informed and valid consent.98 Model Rule 1.7, either in its
1983 form or as recently revised, contains the same prohibition in different lan-
guage, as does Rule 1.06 of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct.99 But there is
more. A client's consent is not effective if, "in the circumstances, it is not reasonably
likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation .... 1,0
It is clear that V&E could not undertake the investigation without Enron's
informed consent. Enron was V&E's largest client and it had done extensive legal
work in structuring and documenting the transactions in question and approving
financial disclosures concerning them. The investigation required V&E to assess
objectively, as if it had not been there at all, the soundness and propriety of its
prior representation. Thus, the situation presented a serious conflict between En-
ron's presumed interest in an objective investigation and V&E's own interests.
Normally, a client experienced in the use of legal services who is advised by
in-house counsel concerning an actual or potential conflict of interest may give a
valid consent if fully informed of the risks and implications of the conflict of
interest. I assume that Enron was fully informed and consulted. Nevertheless,
there is a question whether the consent was a valid one, and, even if it was,
whether the second requirement-the objective standard that the lawyer reason-
ably believe the representation will not be adversely affected by the lawyer's con-
flict of interest-was satisfied.
The situation is analogous to ones arising when a derivative suit charges a
corporate manager with wrongful conduct harmful to the corporation.' 0l The
manager's consent to a lawyer's conflict is insufficient under these circumstances;
the consent must be given by an officer or by board members who are not charged
with misconduct. In the V&E situation, general counsel Derrick and CEO Lay
were high-level officials implicated in the misconduct alleged by Watkins. The
98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 121, 122 (2000).
99. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002), with TEXAS RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 1.06 (1989).
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122(2)(c) (2000).
101. See, e.g., Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of Am., 448 E2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cannon v.
U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F Supp. 209 (N.D. I1. 1975), affd in relevant part, 532 E2d 1118 (7th Cir.
1976); HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 1, at 726-31. Consent to a lawyer's conflict of interest
cannot be given under those circumstances by the corporate managers who may be involved in the
wrongdoing, but only by disinterested officers or board members. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. c(ii) (2000), dealing with the capacity of the consenting person:
"When the person who normally would make the decision whether or not to give consent ... is
otherwise self-interested in the decision whether to consent, special requirements apply to consent."
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explanation that V&E was familiar with the transactions and therefore could pro-
vide the report quickly is a dubious basis for waiver of V&E's serious conflict.
Corporate law requires, in some instances, that internal investigations be con-
ducted by "independent counsel." 02 Moreover, the standard advice for internal
investigations dealing with a wide range of issues (e.g., illegal foreign payments,
illegal campaign contributions, special litigation committees in derivative suit sit-
uations, and indemnification decisions) is that "independent counsel" be used.10 3
In any event, there remains a serious question as to whether V&E's own conflict
of interest would not "adversely affect" its performance of the investigation. V&E's
opinion letter stated that the Enron transactions it facilitated and documented
were "creative and aggressive," suggesting that they went to the outer edge of
legality 10 4 Transactions may be within the bounds of the law even though they
entail legal risks. But a course of action that involves pushing things to the edge
in an effort every quarter to increase the reported earnings creates enormous risk
that some of the many transactions and devices will turn out to be illegal or
fraudulent. The bounds of the law are always indeterminate and fuzzy As Brandeis
said, lawyers should advise conduct that is a safe distance from the uncertain
precipice of illegality rather than attempt to tread the edge of the precipice. 10 5
V&E's letter also concluded that "because of the bad cosmetics involving the
LJM entities and Raptor transactions, coupled with the poor performance of the
merchant investment assets placed in those vehicles and the decline in the value
of Enron stock, there is a serious risk of adverse publicity and litigation."1 6 It was
reasonably foreseeable, as has happened, that that litigation would include V&E
as a defendant and that Enron officers, directors, and other co-defendants would
defend themselves by blaming V&E for giving poor advice. Under these circum-
stances, the conflict appears to be too severe to be undertaken: a reasonable lawyer
would not believe that his representation would not be adversely affected.
The adequacy of the investigation is also questionable. Aside from two investor
relations officers, V&E interviewed only seven high-level officials, most of whom
102. For example, the MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.55(b)(2) (1998-99 Supp.) requires that "special
legal counsel" be used to make decisions whether to indemnify officers and directors. Some states in
the indemnification context phrase the requirement in terms of "independent counsel"-defined in
Ohio as a law firm that has not represented the corporation or any person to be indemnified within
the past five years. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(4) (Anderson 2001).
103. See Arthur F Matthews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655 (1984).
104. Hendrick Opinion Letter, supra note 20, at *6.
105. When lawyers habitually push the envelope of the permissible, their actions will occasionally
involve illegality. As Louis Brandeis put it in replying to claims of business executives that antitrust
law was intolerably fuzzy:
"[Y]our lawyers... can tell you where a fairly safe course lies. If you are walking along a precipice
no human being can tell you how near you can go to that precipice without falling over, because
you may stumble on a loose stone ... ; but anybody can tell you where you can walk perfectly
safe within convenient distance of that precipice." The difficulty which men have felt ... has
been rather that they wanted to go to the limit rather than they wanted to go safely
Hearings Before Sen. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, S. Res. No. 98, 62nd Cong. 1161 (1911) (statement
of Louis D. Brandeis), quoted in HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 1, at 62.
106. Hendrick Opinion Letter, supra note 20, at *7.
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were directly implicated in the self-dealing and fiduciary violations raised by the
Watkins allegations and corroborated by McMahon. V&E relied on the denials of
wrongdoing by those officers and on the fact that none of the persons interviewed
could identify a specific transaction that was illegal. Although McMahon, one of
those interviewed, mentioned ten lower-level employees who might be good
sources of information concerning Fastow's self-dealing, V&E failed to interview
any of them. V&E was informed by Causey of the "mistake" that was made con-
cerning accounting failures on the LJM2 transactions (resulting in the October
16, 2001 restatement of shareholder equity), but never pursued how and why
this occurred. The investigation as a whole, when compared to the subsequent
investigation by the board's special committee, using the services of Wilmer, Cut-
ler & Pickering, appears perfunctory. As the Powers Report stated, the result of
the V&E investigation "was largely predetermined by the scope and nature of the
investigation and the process employed."10 7 It was performed with insufficient
skepticism. 08 Did V&E give some thought to why Enron's managers wanted V&E
to investigate matters related to its own prior work and what opinion they wanted
the firm to provide? There is a serious question of whether adequate representa-
tion was provided to the entity client, as distinct from satisfying the managers'
apparent desire to have a protective document.
V&E, supported by two opinions of legal ethics experts, relies on the charac-
terization of its investigation as "preliminary" and concludes that there was no
conflict of interest because its own prior work was not involved and "no new
facts" were produced by its inquiry.10 9
First, it is a truism that a corporation's regular counsel may inquire whether
allegations of manager misconduct warrant a full-scale investigation. The issue here
is whether the "preliminary" investigation was structured at the managers' request
in a way that made it afinal investigation, a conclusion not based on an adequate
inquiry of whether a full-scale investigation by independent counsel was necessary.
Second, V&E and its experts argue that no independent investigation was nec-
essary. That argument can be made only if legal issues are totally subsumed in the
accounting issues left to Andersen and the "economic substance" questions left to
Enron's managers and board." 10 But legal as well as factual questions were involved
107. PowERs REPORT, supra note 16, at *81.
108. Id.
109. Opinion letter from Charles W Wolfram, Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell Law School, to
John K. Villa, Esq., Williams & Connolly LLP (Mar. 13, 2002); Opinion letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania, to John K. Villa, Esq., Williams & Connolly
LLP (Mar. 13, 2002).
110. A statement of V&E's senior partner, responding to criticism of the firm's role in Enron's
failure, apparently takes that position: "[outside counsel has] 'no role in determining whether, or what,
accounting treatment was appropriate' for a client." John Schwartz, Enron's Many Strands: The Lawyers;
Troubling Questions Ahead for Enron's Law Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at Cl. Lawrence Cunning-
ham criticizes this artificial separation of "legal" and "accounting" issues, arguing that related party
transactions invariably create legal and accounting issues. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Ac-
counting's Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadows, 57 Bus. LAw. 1421, 1454 (2002). A
lawyer's characterization of the legality of the transaction as a "sale" and the financial disclosures
required concerning it are legal questions that have to be decided with knowledge and understanding
of the related accounting principles. The interim conclusions of Enron's court-appointed bankruptcy
examiner are that the appropriate legal characterization of many of Enron's SPE transactions was "loan"
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and, if they were not, why would Enron be interested in V&E's advice and legal
opinion? The extraordinary nature of many of the related-party transactions raised
issues of their legality and whether the financial disclosures concerning them met
legal requirements. If the transactions were merely accounting gimmicks designed
to artificially inflate Enron's profits and conceal its debts, they were illegal and
fraudulent transactions.
Lawyers cannot absolve themselves from legal responsibility by pretending that
only accounting issues are involved, just as accountants cannot relieve themselves
of responsibility by relying on the judgments of lawyers. If a series of transactions
have no substantial business purpose (i.e., no property or risk is transferred to a
third party) and the facts and circumstances suggest that their sole function is to
give the balance sheet a false boost, legal questions are raised that are not resolved
by an accountant's approval.'II If representations are repeatedly made in financial
disclosure documents to the effect that related-party transactions were "at arms'
length," meaning that the managers have reason to believe that comparable market
transactions involving independent parties would be made on the same terms,
the lawyers must ask for some factual verification other than the mere assertion
of interested managers. Legal questions do not evaporate because accountants and
managers are also making judgments.
Finally, V&E's conclusion that "no new facts" emerged from its "preliminary"
inquiry is incorrect.' Watkins and McMahon both identified serious conflicts of
interest on the part of Fastow that had been communicated to Skilling, Buy and
Causey; allegations those executives had ignored. Although Fastow's dual role was
not new information (it had been approved by the board), the way the conflicts
had played out, and the failure of the controls to mitigate the conflicts, were new
information. Watkins and McMahon, cumulatively, identified twelve Enron em-
ployees and three former employees who they said were knowledgeable about
Fastow's conflicts; none of those individuals were interviewed by V&E. The iden-
tities of persons who could provide more detailed information about possible
breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate managers were themselves "new facts"
warranting further inquiry.
COMMON LAW CLAIMS AGAINST LAWYERS
Under the common law, a lawyer was liable for negligence only to those in
privity of contract with the lawyer, typically clients. Although the privity doctrine
has been abolished in negligence cases involving physical harm, it retains consid-
erable vigor in negligence suits claiming purely economic harm, such as a negli-
gent misrepresentation case brought against a lawyer by a non-client. Today,
however, many jurisdictions have adopted exceptions to privity of contract in
rather than "sale," and that the financial disclosures concerning the transactions were false and mis-
leading. See Batson, supra note 18, at *7-*8.
111. Documenting a transaction as a "sale" and issuing a "true sale opinion" to the lender present
legal questions. The First Interim Report of the Bankruptcy Examiner, Batson, supra note 18, at *7-
*8, after studying six representative Enron transactions, concluded that, as a matter of law, most or
all of them were disguised loans rather than sales.
112. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline -- 58 Bus. Law.  167 2002-2003
168 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 58, November 2002
situations in which (1) the purpose of the lawyer-client relationship was to benefit
or influence a third person 1 3 or, alternatively, (2) where someone in the business
of supplying information for others "supplie[d] false information for the guidance
of others [on which they have reasonably relied] in their business transactions." 14
The resulting duty of care is most commonly found in situations in which the
lawyer, in handling a transaction for a client, is dealing directly with the injured
third person or the representation seeks to benefit that person.115
Texas law would probably govern any claims brought against V&E other than
those arising under federal securities laws. In Texas, the privity of contract doc-
trine bars a non-client from bringing a negligence action against a lawyer except
in a few special situations. In McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. EE. Appling
Interests,"16 the Texas Supreme Court followed Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion 552 in a situation in which a lawyer gave negligent legal advice concerning
the legality of a settlement that harmed both the client and the other settling
party 17 The latter was permitted to recover for the lawyer's negligent misrepre-
sentation when information falsely supplied for the guidance of others was given
to "a limited group of persons" to whom the law firm knew or should have known
his client would give the information.118 Does a shareholder have standing to
bring a negligent misrepresentation claim against a professional adviser? The an-
swer may depend upon whether the adviser merely gave legal advice concerning
a transaction or, in addition, prepared a disclosure document intended to provide
information to shareholders and others.
Intentional torts, such as fraud, are not subject to the privity doctrine and may
be brought by non-clients. A fraudulent misrepresentation claim under Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 531 may be brought for economic damages if the
injured parties reasonably relied on the fraudulent misrepresentations and if they
belong to a "class of persons" whom the defendant "has reason to expect" would
rely on the misrepresentation.' 19 State law governing the scope of reliance on
fraudulent misrepresentations, however, is not shaped by the fraud on the market
legal fiction applied in federal securities cases, a fiction that permits any investor
to be included in the "class of persons" who has relied on the misrepresentation.
In Texas, a prospective purchaser of shares who relied upon a fraudulent misrep-
resentation contained in an accountant's report is not within the persons protected
by that section. 120 The purchaser does not belong within the class of persons
113. See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 E2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding a negligent mis-
representation claim against a lawyer under Illinois law).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
115. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000) (recognizing three
exceptions to the privity requirement: (1) when the lawyer's client invites the non-client to rely on
the lawyer's opinion or provision of legal services and the non-client so relies; (2) when one of the
primary objectives of the representation is to benefit the non-client; and (3) when the lawyer's client
is a fiduciary acting primarily to perform fiduciary duties owed to a non-client beneficiary).
116. 991 S.W2d 787 (Tex. 1999).
117. Id. at 791-93.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
119. Id. § 531.
120. See Ernst & Young, LLP v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W3d 573, 581-83 (Tex. 2001).
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whom the defendant had reason to expect would rely on the misrepresentation.
How this decision applies to those who own shares when the misrepresentation
is made is unclear. Another uncertainty is whether the repeated statements of
Enron executives addressed to Enron employees concerning the value of Enron
stock had the effect of putting those employees within the protected class.
CLAIMS AGAINST LAWYERS UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
1. Elimination of Accessory Liability
Central Bank's elimination of accessory liability requires that claims under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 be framed as primary violations.
Central Bank' 2I held that a secondary actor in a securities transaction (e.g., an
accountant or a lawyer) is not liable for damages for aiding and abetting a secu-
rities law violation.122 Criminal liability, however, is still a possibility and the SEC
has authority to bring administrative proceedings against professional advisers.
Civil liability actions against solvent and well-insured accounting and law firms
in a fraud situation now must cast them as primary violators of section 10(b). Under
Central Bank, the plaintiffs must show that a defendant actually engaged in manip-
ulative or deceptive acts or made fraudulent representations. As the Central Bank
decision put it: "Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank,
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omis-
sion) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable .... 123
The federal courts of appeals are divided on whether primary liability reaches
a professional adviser who stays in the background, writing and approving the
fraudulent financial statement or solicitation, but who does not make a misrep-
resentation in person, provide a legal opinion, or whose name is not included in
the document. Several courts of appeals have upheld primary liability when the
complaint alleges that the lawyer, aware of their falsity, anonymously drafted false
representations that were relied on by investors; 12 4 on the other hand, other cir-
cuits have struck down such complaints. 125
121. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). For a discussion
of the effect of Central Bank on secondary actors, see Fisch, supra note 45; Melissa Harrison, The
Assault on the Liabilty of Outside Professionals: Are Lawyers and Accountants Off the Hook?, 65 U. CIN. L.
REv. 473 (1996); Douglas M. Branson, Chasing the Rogue Professional After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 50 SMU L. Rev. 91 (1996).
122. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
123. Id.
124. See Klein v. Boyd, [1998 Transfer Binderl Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,136, at 90,317,90,325
(3d Cir. Feb. 12, 1998) (holding that lawyer "spoke" to the investors by drafting the solicitation
documents even though his identity was unknown to those solicited); Dannenberg v. Painewebber
Inc. (In re Software Tools, Inc.), 50 F3d 615,619 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that substantial participation
in drafting is sufficient if there is "a reasonable inference that [the firm] knew or recklessly disregarded
this falsehood").
125. Anixter v. Home-States Prod. Co., 77 E3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding no primary
liability for representations made by others); Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F3d 1194, 1204 (1 1th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the complaint must include an allegation that the law firm made misrepre-
sentations or omissions upon which the investors relied).
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My own view is that it is wrong to make liability turn on whether or not the
substantial participation of the professional adviser is concealed. Why should an
anonymous draftsman escape responsibility for fraudulent representations merely
because his identity is concealed? My position does push the margins of primary
liability and the uncertainty on this question provides a strong argument for stat-
utory overruling of Central Bank to permit aiding and abetting claims to be
brought against lawyers and accountants. The lawyer, present at the time the fraud
is committed and having reason to know about it, who substantially participates
in facilitating the fraud should be accountable to those who are harmed.
2. Securities Fraud Issues
Securities fraud issues relating to Enron's inside or outside lawyers raise legal
issues that are difficult, controverted, and uncertain.
Lawyer liability for misleading audited financial statements contained in filings under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The extent to which lawyers may rely, without
further inquiry, on what the auditors tell them is a controverted and uncertain
issue. Uncertainty also exists about whether Andersen's application of generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) was proper and, even if so, whether lia-
bility still exists when the actor knows that the financial statements as a whole
do not fairly present the financial position of the company.
Lawyers and accountants often talk as if compliance with GAAP and generally
accepted accounting standards (GAAS), or with an SEC guideline such as the
three percent outside equity participation required of special purpose entities, is
conclusive. The case law is to the contrary. In United States v. Simon,' 26 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a lengthy opinion by Judge Friendly,
affirmed the convictions of three accountants for securities and wire fraud even
though seven eminent accounting experts testified that the accountants' certifi-
cation of the client's financial statements was in full compliance with generally
accepted auditing principles and standards (GAAP and GAAS). The accountants,
knowing that the manager of a vending machine company had diverted millions
of dollars from the company for personal investments in the stock market, in-
cluded a footnote in the financial statement that referred obliquely to the obli-
gation owed to the company by the manager, but did not disclose either the
manager's diversion of funds or the unsatisfactory collateral that supposedly se-
cured it. The decision, affirming the trial court's instructions and the sufficiency
of the evidence, holds that technical compliance with the standards established
by accountants' organizations is relevant but not conclusive evidence of the ac-
countants' good faith; the crucial question for the trier of fact is whether the
accountants' statement was or was not "materially false or misleading.' 27
But there is more. Judge Friendly states that general accounting principles
instruct an accountant what to do in the usual case where he has no reason
to doubt that the affairs of the corporation are being honestly conducted.
126. 425 E2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
127. Id. at 806.
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Once he has reason to believe that this basic assumption is false, an entirely
different situation confronts him. Then ... he must "extend his procedures
to determine whether or not such suspicions are justified." If as a result [of
further inquiry] he finds his suspicions to be confirmed, full disclosure must
be the rule, unless he has made sure the wrong has been righted and pro-
cedures to avoid a repetition have been established. 12
Judge Friendly also stated that
it simply cannot be true that an accountant is under no duty to disclose what
he knows when he hats] reason to believe that, to a material extent, a cor-
poration is being operated not to carry out its business in the interest of all
[shareholders] but for the private benefit of its president . . . . 9
It is an open question whether a lawyer may be charged and convicted as a
principal in a securities action under section 10(b) for conduct similar to that in
Simon. But Simon surely states standards that should also apply to lawyers.
Disclosure of derivatives transactions. Enron's financial disclosures did not reveal
the magnitude of the risks associated with the huge derivatives business in which
Enron was engaged. Did the auditors comply with SEC guidelines? Did the lawyers
know that the disclosures failed to reveal their substantial effect on Enron's balance
sheet, the risks involved, and other material facts? Are the lawyers responsible for
a failure to disclose the underlying realities in a non-misleading manner?
Insider trading. Sales of Enron stock by Enron executives (and perhaps some
in-house lawyers) while Enron's financial condition was deteriorating may present
some insider-trading issues. What did Enron's lawyers know about these sales?
Should they have done something? If so, what? A further complication is that
some of the executives' selling may have been appropriate as part of a planned
program of divestiture of stock held as compensation.
Conflict of interest problems. The conflicts of interest arising from Fastow's (and
later Kopper's) dual roles in the LJM transactions pose serious problems for ev-
eryone who assisted or participated in those transactions. The conflicts were ex-
traordinary; their effect on Enron's reported financial position was very large;
enormous effort and casuistry was employed to conceal the compensation that
Fastow, Kopper and other LJM partners received; and the failure to comply with
equity participation or other accounting requirements on some of the transactions
128. Id. at 806-07.
129. Id. at 806. Subsequent decisions follow Simon. See, e.g., In re Haw. Corp., 567 F Supp. 609,
617 (D. Haw. 1983) ("Compliance with GAAP and GAAS ... will not immunize an accountant when
he consciously chooses not to disclose on a financial statement a known material fact."); Siemens Info.
Sys., Inc. v. TPI Enters., Inc., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,573, at
92,659, 92.662 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), available at 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3018, at *14 (finding that con-
formity to GAAP is not enough; moreover, to avoid liability full disclosure of any suspicions that are
well founded is required); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F Supp. 1314, 1366
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (rejecting accounting firm's argument that compliance with GAAP was "highly per-
suasive"; "the consensual, self-regulating accounting standards were not a substitute for the substantive
standards under the securities laws" which require the accountant "to present a full and fair picture
of its client's financial conduct"); United States v. Colasurdo, 453 F2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding
that the fundamental question is not compliance with GAAP but one of "honesty and good faith").
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ultimately led to public exposure of Enron's financial situation and its precipitous
collapse. What did the inside and outside lawyers know about the details of the
related-party transactions? 30 Did those lawyers give adequate advice concerning
the transactions and the financial disclosures concerning them to top executives
and to the board? Did the lawyers advise the adoption of procedures adequate to
prevent breaches of fiduciary duty and subsequently monitor whether the pro-
cedures were being followed? Did they know that some of the procedures (such
as Skilling's approval and signature) were not followed? Did the failure of inside
and outside lawyers to pursue concerns or allegations of an inside lawyer (Mintz),
Enron's treasurer (McMahon), and an accountant (Watkins) constitute negligence
or worse?
3. The Newby Complaint
The lawsuit brought by Enron shareholders now includes most of the major
participants in Enron's failure: officers, directors, law firms (V&E and K&E),
accountants (Andersen), and seven investment banks.13' The complaint charges
that the two law firms were active participants in an ongoing fraud in which
manipulative and deceptive devices that they created and approved were a central
component. V&E, the complaint alleges, inter alia, participated in the fraudulent
scheme by assisting in the structuring and documenting of fraudulent transactions
that had no purpose other than to falsely misstate Enron's earnings; V&E also
provided "true sale" opinions that enabled the related-party transactions to take
place even though in some of them no property changed hands; and its "prelim-
inary investigation" was part of the cover-up of the fraudulent scheme. K&E, the
complaint alleges, participated in the fraudulent scheme by structuring the
related-party transactions "to falsify Enron's financial condition."' 32 V&E spoke
directly to creditors and investors in the LJM transactions through legal opinions
and to shareholders and investors by approval of financial statements concerning
those transactions.
130. Information concerning the extensive participation of V&E in creating Enron's special purpose
partnerships, providing true sale opinions concerning some of them, and advising and approving
Enron's financial disclosures concerning them is contained in the POWERs REPORT, supra note 16, and
Ellen Joan Pollock, Limited Partners: Lawyers for Enron Faulted Its Deals, Didn't Force Issue, WALL ST.
J., May 22, 2002, at Al. The Pollock article provides the following details: one of the partner's firms,
Ronald Astin, raised conflict of interest objections to the participation of Enron employees (Fastow
and Kopper) in managing and profiting from the JEDI and Chewco partnerships in 1997, but did not
pursue the matter when Enron went ahead anyway. V&E also represented Enron in a series of off-
balance sheet transactions with the LJM partnerships in 1999, providing "true sale" opinions in some
of them but declining to do so in others. For the latter, Enron had no difficulty in obtaining opinions
from another firm, Andrews & Kurth. V&E also prepared the documents for Raptor transactions with
LJM2, but Astin communicated his concerns about some of the deals to an Enron in-house lawyer,
Rex Rogers; Astin was concerned because risks and rewards were not shifted from Enron to the
partnerships. Opinions on some of those transactions were also obtained from Andrews & Kurth.
V&E's concerns were not communicated to Enron's CEO, Lay, even though Reasoner, V&E's managing
partner, had a close personal relationship with him, nor were the firm's concerns communicated to
the Enron board. V&E also advised and approved Enron's decisions not to disclose in its 2001 proxy
statement the compensation Fastow received from managing the partnerships. Id.
131. Amended Compliant, Newby v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3624 (S.D. Tex. filed Apr. 8, 2002).
132. Id. at 447.
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4. Conclusion
More guidance is needed concerning a lawyer's responsibilities under the se-
curities laws. The continuing controversy, confusion, and uncertainty concerning
a lawyer's duties in the various situations that arise in securities and client fraud
situations such as Enron need clarification. Bar organizations tend to support the
present state of affairs because it permits them to maintain that lawyers have
extremely limited or no obligations under current law in situations not subject to
the "due diligence" requirement applicable to new offerings. The bar's position
does not reflect the uncertainty of present law, which frequently results in large
settlements and reputation loss whenever lawyers rely on it. The current situation
is both unfair to lawyers and fails to give sufficient protection to the public interest
in corporate integrity and honest markets.
PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTED REFORMS
The conduct of the inside and outside lawyers who represented Enron, Arthur
Andersen, and the many financial institutions involved in the Enron scandal tell
the same story that has been told to us by a long string of major financial frauds
for fifty years: the professional ideal of "independent professional judgment" does
not inform the behavior of some lawyers who represent large corporations in
major transactions and high-stakes litigation. These lawyers take the position that
they must do everything for the client that the client's managers want them to
do, providing the conduct is permitted by law. The problem is that by constantly
going to the edge of the law and taking a very permissive view of what the law
permits, these lawyers gradually adopt a mindset that ignores and may eventually
assist the client's managers in illegality that harms third persons and the client
entity. 33 These lawyers have confused the role of advocate in litigation or adver-
sary negotiation with the need of corporate clients for independent, objective
advice in the course of corporate decision-making. Current practices have resulted
in a widespread problem, not just a failure of individual law firms. 134
133. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 701, 720 (1993) ("Responsible law-giving require [s] recognition.., that honest lawyers
can suffer the misfortune of having dishonest clients."). Lawyers representing such clients risk civil
and criminal sanctions for aiding and abetting client fraud if the lawyers protect client confidences
too zealously Thus an honest lawyer "is at risk of being drawn into a transaction which is tainted with
fraud . .. land] can be charged with being an accessory to the client's wrongdoing ... [Responsible
law-giving] requires having no tears for clients who draw their lawyers into fraudulent schemes." Id.
Responsible law-giving also involves heeding Brandeis' advice that lawyers in counseling clients and
facilitating transactions should channel client conduct away from the precipice of illegality onto ground
that is solid. See supra note 105.
134. Law firms involved in major client fraud situations are identified by name in this Article to make
it clear that many prestigious law firms have been the victims (and perhaps the aiders and abettors) of
client fraud. It is not a "bad apples" problem requiring greater vigilance on the part of prosecutors or
regulators. There are systemic problems that require broader and more meaningful reforms. See also
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAw. 1403 (2002)
(arguing that the verification and certification functions of gatekeepers-accountants, analysts, and law-
yers-failed to operate effectively because legal risks declined during the 1990s and changes in the
provision of professional services created conflicts of interest that affected independent judgment). Im-
plicit in Coffee's argument is the conclusion drawn here: professional advisers should be made more
accountable to the law to deter them from acquiescing in managers' unlawful requests.
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Lawyers rationalize their behavior by viewing others (the managers, the ac-
countants, etc.) as responsible for the decisions that are made, largely ignoring
their own responsibility. As potential disaster looms, those involved (managers,
accountants, and lawyers) are faced with only bad choices and, cognitive psy-
chology tells us, there is a strong tendency to take even greater risks in what turns
out to be an unsuccessful effort to avoid financial failure and disclosure of the
prior fraud. 135 A "circle of blame"-a classic form of deflection of responsibility-
results when things predictably go wrong and each group of participants places
the blame on the others. 136 When that occurs it becomes likely that many of the
major participants who are solvent and have assets (e.g., the outside law firm with
substantial liability insurance coverage) will be forced eventually to make large
settlements that partially recompense some of those who were harmed. This sce-
nario played itself out hundreds of times during the savings and loan crisis and
is already underway in the Enron affair.
For a variety of reasons, too many lawyers tend to believe that they are largely
immune from legal liability when they turn a blind eye to signs that those who
are in control of the client corporation are engaged in fraudulent conduct.137
Applicable ethics rules, especially the exceptions to the professional duty of con-
fidentiality and the rule dealing with steps to be taken when insiders refuse to
take steps to rectify a prospective or ongoing fraud, are controverted, ambiguous,
and often discretionary. Although courts have held that a lawyer is required to
take some meaningful steps to prevent a future or ongoing fraud, the decisions
are few and only rarely apply effective sanctions to lawyers. Confused by the
barrister's rule that the lawyer is not supposed to displace the judge or jury by
"judging the client," lawyers apply the same approach to corporate actions in
135. "Prospect theory" in cognitive psychology finds that decision-makers tend to be risk averse
when deciding between two choices that result in a gain, but risk preferring when faced with two
choices that result in a loss. Jeffrey Rachlinski has applied this theory to the framing of choices in
litigation. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113
(1996). He and Richard Painter have applied the same approach to managers and lawyers faced with
a decision whether to disclose or conceal information that, whatever they do, involves large risks of
loss. Business and legal literature tend to confirm the hypothesis that managers and lawyers will be
risk preferring in this situation, opting for concealment of information rather than disclosure. See
Richard W Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1399, 1413-24 (2000) (stating the theory and the literature and events that support it).
136. The "circle of blame" among those involved in Enron transactions is also characteristic of
lawyers' and judges' views concerning discovery abuse in high-stakes litigation. See Lawrence J. Fox
et al., Report: Ethics Beyond the Rules: Historical Preface, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 691, 695 (1998) ("each
participant justifies his or her conduct, but savages the conduct of others"). Studies of business or-
ganizations reflect many of the same themes of diffused responsibility leading to no one accepting
responsibility while attempting to maintain secrecy and then blaming others when secrecy is lost. See,
e.g., ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 17-22 (1988). Other
studies reflect a theme found in the PowERS REPORT, supra note 16, that the ethical climate of an
organization is set by the conduct of those in authority See DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH
DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 405-09 (1996) (concluding that an
organizational culture established at high levels, emphasizing production goals, often develops a nor-
mative environment that conflicts with that of the outside world, becoming a deviant culture).
137. For discussion of the reasons why lawyers tend to believe they are immune from liability, see
Susan P Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARVARD J. PUB. POLICY (forthcoming 2002).
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which one of their major functions is to determine whether the action meets legal
standards. The managers, who hire and fire lawyers, rather than the corporate
entity itself, become the client. The Central Bank case and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act also give lawyers a false sense of security by suggesting that
they are not accountable for assisting a securities fraud.
Preaching to lawyers and bar groups about their moral and public responsi-
bilities has proven to be ineffective. Professional discipline, for a variety of reasons,
provides virtually no control over the failure of law firms to monitor the partners
who are bringing in juicy fees from corporate clients.' 38 The spread of limited
liability partnerships accentuates the willingness of partners to ignore the risks
that other partners are taking. Today's emphasis on "the bottom line" both in
corporations and law firms gives rise to a culture valuing the false sense of prestige
and status that flows from being among the leaders in the annual listings of profits
per partner. From the vantage point of respect for law and the public responsi-
bilities of lawyers, the current scene runs the risk of being "a race to the bottom."
As stated above, there is a systemic problem that requires systemic solutions.1
39
The ABA and major state bar organizations speak with divergent voices when
engaged in formulating the ethics rules that should govern a lawyer in client fraud
situations. Many lawyers, especially business and securities lawyers, argue that a
lawyer should be at least permitted to disclose confidential information to prevent
or rectify a client fraud. They argue that the professional duty of confidentiality
should include the same policy that the law has always applied to the attorney-
client privilege: confidentiality evaporates when a client attempts to use the privi-
lege to further a crime or fraud. This balance of confidentiality and the public
interest in preventing crimes and frauds has been persuasive to most state courts
in promulgating ethics rules.
But the ABA House of Delegates and some major jurisdictions (e.g., California
and District of Columbia) have differed, concluding that client candor and ad-
versary representation would suffer if a lawyer were permitted to disclose infor-
138. Discipline of large firm corporate lawyers rarely occurs even in situations in which lawyers
have been sanctioned by a court for misconduct or found civilly liable for assisting a client's fraud.
As indicated previously, ethics rules applicable in client fraud are controverted, ambiguous, and often
discretionary. Moreover, disciplinary authorities lack the resources and the will to charge large law
firm lawyers with misconduct in matters that are complex and would require large effort. The occa-
sional efforts to do so are attacked vigorously by the organized bar. For other reasons why professional
discipline plays virtually no role in the regulation of lawyers engaged in specialized corporate practice
in extensively regulated fields such as securities law, see Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar
Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639, 643-50
(1994); see also Koniak & Cramton, supra note 137.
139. The blizzard of accounting and related scandals following Enron and Andersen suggests the
breadth of the problem: Adelphia, CMS Energy, Dynergy, Merrill Lynch, Tyco, WorldCom, Xerox.
"'Everybody did this,' says economic historian Peter Temin ... 'The people who got in trouble are
those who are most at the edge. Enron didn't get caught. Enron got so far out on the edge that it fell
off.'" David Wessel, Venal Sins: Why the Bad Guys of the Boardroom Emerged en Masse, WALL ST. J.,
June 20, 2002, at. Al. Treasury Secretary O'Neill "recalls a parade of Wall Street professionals who
came to his office with plans for 'new and exotic' financial maneuvers to reduce his company's tax
bill or report debt levels in ways 'not clearly prohibited by the tax code or law,' but not designed to
illuminate corporate operations, either." Id. "The remnants of a professional ethos in accounting, law
and securities analysis gave way to getting the maximum revenue per partner." Id.
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mation to prevent or rectify crimes or frauds. 140 These voices oppose attempts to
clarify the duties of lawyers who find themselves in client fraud situations. Some
of the bar's apologies and evasions are:
" Lawyer liability will grow (why shouldn't lawyers be liable to third persons
when they aid or assist a client in defrauding third persons?).
" The rules governing lawyers aren't clear (why should lawyers be entitled to
more clarity than is provided to non-lawyers, who must deal all the time with
uncertain rules in law, accounting and elsewhere?).
" The lawyer's job is to provide zealous advocacy (they are not acting as
courtroom advocates but as office counselors who can assist only lawful
transactions).
" "Everybody [is] doing it" (that may well be the case but since when does that
excuse wrongdoing?). 141
Many informed and able commentators argue that the Enron collapse should
not provide the basis for any "reforms" that would affect lawyers and the legal
profession. Some tinkering with the accounting rules may be desirable, but in all
other respects things are just fine as they are.142 The savings and loan crisis also
led to some cries for reform, but the accounting and legal professions, usually
supported by the corporate community, opposed the reforms. The result was
legislation designed to deal with too much litigation against corporations and
their advisers: enactment of limited-liability partnership statutes in virtually every
state, and on the federal level, passage of the 1995 Act and other follow-up se-
curities legislation. Professional advisers were given more protection from being
accountable for their legal wrongs.
I believe that the following reforms are needed to make lawyers more account-
able guardians of the public trust, a goal that depends upon lawyers channeling
conduct along lawful paths rather than looking the other way as their clients
violate the law. We need more respect for the law on the part of all lawyers, not
gradually accelerating disrespect.
CHANGES IN FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION
When the first draft of this Article was prepared in April 2002, one of its
principal recommendations was that legislation should be adopted to give the
SEC clear authority to regulate and discipline lawyers who assist clients in secu-
rities laws violations. At that time I could not anticipate that such legislation would
in fact be enacted. For many years the accounting and legal professions, usually
140. The ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, is a happy exception. The Report treats the current
scene as one requiring substantial improvements in the corporate governance process and major
changes in the ethics rules governing lawyers.
141. See William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's
Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAw & Soc. INQUiRY 243, 268-74 (1998) (discussing these
and other apologies and evasions).
142. See, e.g., ThomasJ. Donahue, Let the Market Do Its Work, NAT'L L.J., May 6, 2002, at A20; C.
Evan Stewart, Caveat 'Reformers': Lessons Not To Be Learned from Enron's Collapse, 34 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 310 (Feb. 25, 2002).
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joined by the business community, have managed to block federal legislation that
would provide the SEC with greater authority to regulate accountants and lawyers.
The SEC, recognizing that political opposition to such regulation was affecting
its staffing and funding, abandoned its earlier efforts to set some minimal stan-
dards for lawyers. In view of this background, I believed that a political whirl-
wind would be necessary to produce legislation explicitly authorizing the SEC
to create standards of professional conduct applicable to lawyers engaged in
securities law practice.
However unlikely it seemed in April 2002, that whirlwind came about some
three months later. The storm aroused by Enron's collapse became a hurricane
after the WorldCom bankruptcy and the corporate responsibility scandals at a
number of other major companies. The political fallout of the public's concern
resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Corporate Reform Act") 143 which became law
on July 30, 2002. The Corporate Reform Act made two major changes in the law
governing lawyers. Section 307 of the Act, first, conferred a broad power on the
SEC to establish rules of professional conduct for securities lawyers and, second,
directed the SEC to issue a specific rule requiring a lawyer for a public company
to climb the ladder of authority within the company, to the board of directors, if
necessary, "to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach
of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof ... if
the [chief legal] counsel or [chief executive] officer does not appropriately respond
to the evidence [by] adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or
sanctions with respect to the violation.' 44
SEC AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT FOR SECURITIES LAWYERS
The initial clause of section 307 gives the SEC 180 days to "issue rules, in the
public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum stan-
143. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The legislation was supported by a unanimous
vote in the Senate and an overwhelming vote in the House. My discussion of section 307 of the Act
has benefited from unpublished letters and e-mails of George Cohen, Richard Painter, and John Steele.
144. § 307, 116 Stat. at 784. Section 307 of the Corporate Reform Act, entitled "Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility for Attorneys," reads as follows:
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall issue rules,
in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way
in the representation of issuers, including a rule-
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, as nec-
essary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring
the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors ... or
to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed
directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
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dards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission in any way in the representation of [public companies] . '. . ."I" This
grant of general rulemaking authority in the professional responsibility area is
broad and mandatory. The phrase "minimum standards of professional conduct"
characterizes all professional rules of conduct. The only constraints are the limi-
tation to lawyers practicing federal securities law and the requirements that the
rules serve the public interest and protect investors.
The provision transfers primary regulatory authority in this area of practice
from the state courts that now promulgate the profession's ethics rules to the SEC.
Securities lawyers will now be subject to discipline by the SEC for violations of
the rules of conduct the Commission adopts. Because no preemptive intent is
indicated, securities lawyers will remain subject to state disciplinary proceedings
that are not inconsistent with the rules of professional conduct adopted by the
SEC. The many questions that will arise concerning the scope of SEC authority,
the manner in which the SEC promulgates and enforces the conduct rules, the
effect of the new rules on state authority under the Supremacy Clause, and the
like are important matters, but they are beyond the scope of this Article.
How should the SEC approach this broad task during the limited time available
(i.e., prior to January 26, 2003)? 1 believe that the SEC would be well-advised to
start with a review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended
in February 2002 in response to the recommendations of the Ethics 2000 Com-
mission. That review should then determine which rules and topics should be
made applicable to securities lawyers. The SEC's long experience in enforcing the
securities laws in the interest of investors can inform judgments whether a par-
ticular aspect of securities law practice should lead to an SEC rule defining min-
imum professional conduct for securities lawyers. The rules relating to prohibited
assistance, the professional duty of confidentiality, conflicts of interest, represent-
ing an entity, withdrawal, and probably other subjects should be studied and
modified as necessary to meet the special requirements of securities law practice.
Rules having to do with subjects that do not directly relate to the special circum-
stances of securities practice (e.g., rules dealing with the economic regulation of
the profession, unauthorized practice, and the provision of information about
legal services) should be omitted from consideration.
In several important areas, the SEC should substitute its own judgment and
that of the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility for those of the ABA
House of Delegates. The Corporate Reform Act requires that it do so with respect
to Rule 1.13, representing an entity146 With respect to the rules relating to dis-
closure of confidential information to prevent or rectify a client's prospective or
ongoing crime or fraud, the Task Force's recommendations, formed in the light
of current problems and informed by broad knowledge of corporate and securities
practice, should be substituted for the rules adopted by the House of Delegates
in February 2002.
145. Id.
146. See id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002).
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SEC RULE REQUIRING LAWYERS To CLIMB THE
CORPORATE LADDER
In addition to the required general rulemaking with respect to the professional
conduct of securities lawyers, the SEC is directed to establish a rule within 180
days that will require securities lawyers to climb the ladder of authority within a
public company "to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof
to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company," and to
the board or board committees if those officers do not take "appropriate remedial
measures or sanctions."147
The breadth of the provision is notable: it applies to any "breach of fiduciary
duty," issues that generally are viewed as matters of state corporate law unless
federal law creates a fiduciary duty The major qualification is that the violation
must be a "material" one. Until the SEC provides more guidance, securities lawyers
will have to make difficult judgment calls: When does a lawyer have sufficient
"evidence" of a violation? What constitutes a "securities law violation," a "breach
of fiduciary duty," or a "similar violation"? When is a violation "material"?
48
The statutorily-prescribed rule clearly draws on the prior actions and decisions
of the SEC. In essence, it is a version of the standard that the SEC has been
pushing for years: in-house and outside counsel who become aware of facts
strongly suggesting that an agent of a corporation is involved in securities fraud
must take steps, designed to be effective, to ensure that the board understands
147. § 307, 116 Stat. at 784. The prior work and advocacy of two academic lawyers contributed
substantially to the enactment of the Corporate Reform Act. Richard Painter initiated the matter by
asking the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission to amend Rule 1.13 to require a lawyer to inform senior
officers of the corporation of illegal acts for which the corporation could be held responsible. If those
officers failed to take appropriate preventive measures, the lawyer should be required to report the
matter to the board of directors or to an appropriate organ of the board, for example, the outside
directors or the audit committee. See Painter, supra note 63, at 10-11 (discussing his proposed amend-
ment to Rule 1.13). In 2001, Painter revised his proposal as an SEC regulation and obtained the
support of about forty academic lawyers (including the author). See Letter from Richard W Painter,
College of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, to Harvey Pitt, SEC, Chairman (Mar. 7,
2002) and response letter from David Becker, SEC, General Counsel, to Richard W Painter, College
of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Mar. 28, 2002) (declining to consider the matter
because of the legal profession's heated opposition to it and the SEC's lack of express legislative authority),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/responsibility-reatedmat.html.
Susan Koniak, who testified before a Senate committee considering the role of lawyers in the Enron
affair, later worked with Senator Edwards and his staff on the rulemaking proposal that became section
307 of the Senate bill in mid-July Senator Edwards, with Ms. Koniak's assistance, defended the
provision in the Senate and in the conference committee against opposition fueled by the ABA. The
provision survived, becoming law on July 30, 2002.
148. The generality of the statutory terms outlining the report requirement can be taken care of
by good drafting on the part of the SEC. The major problems are the vagueness of "evidence" of a
"material violation" and the absence of an intent standard. The SEC should make it clear that "evidence"
does not refer to evidence rules concerning admissibility, but to "facts or circumstances that a lawyer,
acting with reasonable care, knows or reasonably should know are credible and substantial evidence
of a violation of federal securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company
or any agent thereof .... Comments to the text of the report rule should make it clear that a duty
of inquiry exists under some circumstances. The ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 208 n.49,
relying on ABA ethics opinions, provides a useful statement of the facts or circumstances that give
rise to a duty to investigate. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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what the lawyer has discovered and must take steps to encourage the board to
take action to disclose what it has discovered to the SEC and investing public.1
49
Moreover, the new law clearly draws on the ethics rule now in effect in all or
virtually all states. Model Rule 1.13 requires a corporate lawyer to act in the best
interests of the corporation.150 Many commentators interpret the rule as requiring
a lawyer to climb the ladder of authority in the organization when the lawyer
knows that the organization's managers are harming the organization (and third
persons) by engaging in criminal or fraudulent conduct. The difference is that the
new law clearly requires the lawyer to act in these extreme circumstances, while
Rule 1.13 is ambiguous and can be construed as discretionary and permissive. In
short, the new law provides clear and helpful guidance to lawyers.
Several objections to the new law should be discussed. First, the ABA and state
bar organizations argue that the formulation of rules of professional conduct for
lawyers has been and should be carried out by the high courts of the states and
not by federal regulation. The exclusion of the legislative process, both state and
federal, leaves lawyers and their organizations more in control, resulting in more
self-regulation than is given to any other profession. Self-regulation has many
advantages, but falls short when the interests of the profession are put above
those of the public. On the fundamental question of a lawyer's duty to prevent
or rectify criminal or fraudulent conduct by a client or a client's agent, the ABA
and a number of state bars have put the interests of the profession above those
of the public. Federal legislation and regulation provide the best vehicle for
needed change.
Moreover, the dispersion of authority to the high courts of the fifty states and
the District of Columbia results in rules that are often conflicting and inevitably
different. The ABA makes recommendations that are then filtered through bar
groups in each state. The result, at least in every state with a large lawyer popu-
lation, is a separate set of rules with some common characteristics but differing
language. Conflicting requirements and lack of uniformity are especially fre-
quent and most troublesome on the vital subject of a lawyer's obligations in
dealing with the prevention and rectification of criminal and fraudulent client
conduct, which is precisely the problem that Congress and the public are most
concerned about.
The federal government has a strong interest in assuring the integrity of secu-
rities markets and the role and conduct of accountants and lawyers are important
components. Moreover, there is a long history of federal involvement in special-
ized areas of law, including patent law, tax law, securities law, and other fields.
The further development of distinctive rules of professional conduct in various
149. The court in the National Student Marketing case stated that the lawyers had a duty to take
steps that would prevent the securities violation, which in that case might require informing share-
holders if the officers and directors refused to act. 457 F Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978); see In re
Carter & Johnson, SEC Release No. 34-17597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,145 (Feb. 28, 1981); In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554, [1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,067, at 83,597 (Dec. 3, 1992).
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002).
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areas of practice may well be a desirable development in departing from the "one
size fits all" approach of state ethics rules. The Commerce Clause clearly supports
this federal involvement, which has the great benefit of providing lawyers in those
areas of practice with clearer and more uniform standards.
The ABA, in opposing section 307, urged that Congress should allow the pro-
cess begun by the ABA Task Force to continue. But consider the problems. The
Task Force arrived at a "preliminary" recommendation that Model Rule 1.13 be
amended by the ABA to require lawyers to report to superior authority within the
organization in situations similar to those dealt with in the federal legislation.1
5
1
Even if the Task Force persists in the recommendation, it is unclear whether the
ABA House of Delegates will adopt the Task Force's sweeping recommendations
concerning exceptions to confidentiality (Rules 1.6 and 4.1) and reporting within
an organization (Rule 1.13). Similar recommendations were rejected by the House
of Delegates during the past year as well as in 1991 and 1983. Even if the ABA
adopted the Task Force's proposed amendments, that action would only begin a
long and uncertain process in which fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions would consider
whether and in what form to adopt the changes. The process would take years
and the results would probably be uneven and non-uniform. Federal regulation,
on the other hand, will produce a uniform national rule by the end of this year.
Nor does the new "climb the ladder" rule involve a breach of confidentiality
(i.e., disclosure not authorized by current ethics rules). The new rule is limited
to disclosure within the client organization. The rule merely ensures that the
superior officers or board of a public company will learn of information that is of
vital importance to the company and be in a position to take corrective action.
In short, the new rule overcomes the tendency of lawyers to treat the managers,
with whom the lawyer deals day to day, as if they were "the client," rather than
to follow the law in treating the corporate entity as the client. In short, the rule
protects the interests of the real client.
Another objection is that the new rule will expose lawyers to greater civil lia-
bility and that the threat of liability will distort the lawyer-client relationship.
Section 307 does not create any new private cause of action against lawyers who
participate in corporate fraud. Existing law providing for malpractice liability to
a client and, in some situations, liability to non-clients, are unaffected. It is true
that any new standard of professional conduct provides an opportunity in a mal-
practice or third-party liability situation for a showing that a lawyer has departed
from customary standards. That would be true of the ABA Task Force recom-
151. The ABA Task Force proposal would require the lawyer to report "that the officer or employee
is acting illegally or fraudulently, or in breach of a duty to the corporation ... [wlhen the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know" of such activity ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 204. The
federal rule is triggered by the lawyer's possession of credible "evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof
.... " Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307(1), 116 Stat. 745, 784. Both rules
appear to reach all serious violations of law and the required element of knowledge or intent is similar.
The major difference is that the federal rule is applicable only to "public companies" (about 17,000
corporations who are subject to SEC financial disclosure obligations) while the Task Force proposal
would reach all entity organizations, public or private, profit or nonprofit.
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mendations as well as the new federal rule. But this risk must be weighed against
the uncertainties of current law, which lead some lawyers to remain silent while
corporate managers commit illegal acts that harm the corporation and third per-
sons. Greater clarity about a lawyer's duties in these troublesome situations may
well reduce the frequency of claims rather than increase them, while protecting
important interests of the economy and the public. And even if lawyer exposure
to liability claims is increased somewhat, the trade-off in prevention of serious
frauds on the public justifies that risk.
Whether the new rule will substantially affect the lawyer-client relationship is
also highly speculative.I52 Some lawyers worry that corporate lawyers will be too
self-protective and, as a result, will prematurely "jump the queue" straight to the
board, thus undermining the chief legal officer or manager to whom the lawyer
regularly reports. If so, candor and trust between outside counsel and those of-
ficers would be adversely affected. It seems more likely, however, that inside and
outside counsel will allow the issue to percolate within the corporation in the
customary manner until it is properly resolved. The informal norms by which
sensitive issues are handled within a corporation are extremely powerful; corpo-
rate lawyers will continue to respect them and will not go up the ladder prema-
turely The report provision merely gives the outside lawyer some last-resort lev-
erage that may ensure that the problem is properly resolved at an earlier stage
without going to the board.
In sum, the new federal rule is a welcome, meaningful, prudent, and timely
reform. The bar should embrace it rather than resist it. Thus, I am very pleased
that congressional action has deprived me of one of the reform recommendations
for federal action that I included in my initial draft. Several other important
matters, however, are left untouched by the Corporate Reform Act and I now turn
to them.
OTHER DESIRABLE CHANGES IN FEDERAL
LAW AND REGULATION
53
Restore a private right of action for aiding and abetting liability of professionals who
assist a client in a securities fraud. The Central Bank case should be overruled by
legislative action.1 54 Congress should restore private causes of action against law-
yers and accountants for aiding and abetting federal securities law violations. Since
1994 professional advisers can be held civilly liable for securities fraud only if
they are central participants in a client's fraudulent scheme, that is, primary vi-
olators. Ethics rules placing limits on what a lawyer may do for a client are phrased
in terms of a prohibition of "assisting" fraudulent or illegal conduct and state and
federal law routinely provide for civil and criminal liability for someone who
assists another in wrongdoing. The absence of civil liability for aiding and abetting
the federal securities law puts pressure on courts to stretch the meaning of what
152. 1 am indebted to John Steele for the ideas in this paragraph.
153. This section draws on conversations with Susan Koniak.
154. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
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constitutes a primary violation. The absence of a private cause of action for aiding
and abetting securities fraud is an anomaly that should be corrected.
Apply the "recklessness" and "willful blindness" standards to govern intent (scienter)
in proceedings against lawyers and accountants under the federal securities laws. Leg-
islation overruling the Central Bank case should also provide that a uniform scien-
ter standard of "recklessness" and "willful blindness" applies in all securities ac-
tions whether they are civil or criminal, public or private. The standards that
govern those who aid and abet a fraud in nearly all other contexts under federal
and state law should apply also to lawyers and accountants whether the action is
brought by a federal prosecutor, the SEC or by private plaintiffs.
Give the SEC clear authority to regulate and discipline lawyers who assist clients in
securities laws violations. Section 307 of the Corporate Reform Act appears to
remove the legal cloud that has long surrounded Rule 102(e), promulgated by
the SEC to discipline securities lawyers and accountants. 55 Its enactment, by
giving the SEC express rulemaking authority to promulgate "minimum standards
of professional conduct" for securities lawyers should make it clear that the SEC
need not first secure a ruling from a federal district court affirming that the lawyer
has violated the securities laws before proceeding against that lawyer via Rule
102(e).15 6
Provide the SEC with adequate funding to carry out existing and new responsibilities.
The SEC has been under-funded for many years. Salaries of its professionals are
much lower than those paid to professionals performing similar work in the pri-
vate sector. Moreover, SEC professionals have been paid at a lower rate than that
provided to federal government professionals who perform similar tasks. Finally,
the SEC has been woefully understaffed in relation to current duties and cannot
handle new ones without increased funding. The SEC should be provided with
sufficient funds for all of its current responsibilities. In addition, funds should be
provided to enforce the rules required under the Corporate Reform Act and
155. Rule 102(e) has been upheld as a valid exercise of the SEC's rule-making authority as to
accountants, see, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 E2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979), but I know of no
similarly definitive rulings when it comes to the rule's application to lawyers. Moreover, the fact that
prior to the enactment of section 307 it was a rule and not a clear statutory mandate led courts to withhold
deference from the SEC's interpretation of the rule and application. Cf. Checkosky v. SEC (In re Chec-
kosky), 23 E3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994); and especially, Checkosky v. SEC, 139 E3d 221, 225 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (criticizing the SEC's straddling of the fence on whether negligence sufficed in a Rule 102(e)
proceeding or whether recklessness was the standard for discipline). That matter, too, should be decided.
Moreover, some modest discipline, a reprimand but not disbarment or suspension, should be provided
on a finding of negligence. By definition negligence is the first step on the road to recklessness and it
should be discouraged, at least when it comes to accountants, by the threat of SEC censure or reprimand.
156. See Ann Maxey, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Securities Lawyers: New Remedies vs. Old Pol-
icies, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 537 (1997) (discussing the SEC's declaration that it would not use Rule
102(e) against lawyers without first seeking a court ruling that the lawyers had violated the securities
laws). This declaration was one of many retreats the SEC has had to make over the years from its
efforts to see to it that securities lawyers were not recklessly assisting fraud. For a description of some
of that history of retreat and how aggressively the bar reacts to any attempt by the SEC to rein in
reckless securities lawyers, see HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 1, at 117-39, 739-43. See
also Susan P Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992); Susan P.
Koniak, When Courts Refuse To Frame the Law and Others Frame It to Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1075 (1993).
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enough funds to bring enforcement actions against lawyers and accountants who
aid and abet securities fraud. The Department of Justice will also need additional
funding if the new criminal provisions of the Act are to be anything other than
window dressing.
Recent actions at the federal level have alleviated some of these concerns by
increasing modestly the staffing and funding of the SEC. The long-term concern
is whether political support for the SEC will continue several years from now
when public attention will have shifted from issues of corporate responsibility
CHANGES IN STATE ETHICS RULES
In addition to reforms at the federal level, the high courts of the states need to
amend their ethics codes to achieve the following goals: (1) provide nationwide
uniformity on the important issue of exceptions to confidentiality, and (2) bring
about conformity of state ethics rules with the emerging federal law on a corporate
lawyer's duty to report law violations within a client organization.
Adoption by all states of an ethics rule providing an exception to the professional
duty of confidentiality to prevent and rectify client fraud. As of 2001, forty-one U.S.
jurisdictions permit or require a lawyer to disclose confidential information to
prevent a client's proposed or ongoing criminal fraud. Most of these states, how-
ever, do not have provisions permitting the rectification of a fraud that involved
the use of the lawyer's services. Despite its rejection in August 2001 by the ABA
House of Delegates, the Ethics 2000 proposal contains a model that is worthy of
adoption in all states. Proposed Model Rule 1.6(b) provides for both prevention
and rectification:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:...
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is rea-
sonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial inter-
ests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client
has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial in-
terests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or
has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's service .... 157
The ABA Task Force Preliminary Report "recommends that the House of Del-
egates reconsider and adopt these Ethics 2000 proposals[,]" quoting the rationale
contained in the Ethics 2000 recommendation. 5 8 When a client seriously abuses
the lawyer-client relationship by using the lawyer's services in furtherance of a
crime or fraud, a lawyer should be permitted to reveal information to the extent
necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud reasonably
certain to result in substantial economic loss. "The client's entitlement [to confi-
dentiality] must be balanced against the prevention of the injury that would
157. Proposed Model Rule 1.6(b), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel6.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2002).
158. ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 205.
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otherwise be suffered and the interest of the lawyer in being able to prevent the
misuse of the lawyer's services."'' 9
The Task Force, however, goes further than did the Ethics 2000 Commission
in recommending that the disclosure under Rule 1.6 be
mandatory, rather than permissive, in order to prevent client conduct known
to the lawyer to involve a crime, including violations of federal securities
laws and regulations, in furtherance of which the client has used or is using
the lawyer's services, and which is reasonably certain to result in substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another.160
The Preliminary Report also makes desirable recommendations for changes in
the text or comments of Rules 1.2 and 4.1, which prohibit active participation in
a client's criminal or fraudulent conduct. The Report argues that these provisions
are overly restrictive in applying only if the lawyer "knows" that a person asso-
ciated with an organization is engaging in or intends to engage in criminal or
fraudulent conduct. Lawyers are encouraged to avoid knowing by "accepting man-
agement's instructions and limiting their advice and/or services to a narrowly
defined scope, ignoring the context or implications of the advice they are giv-
ing."' 6' Because some lawyers may "turn[] a blind eye to the natural consequences
of what they observe and claim[] that they did not 'know' that the corporate
officers they were advising were engaged in misconduct,"162 Rules 1.2(d) and 4.1
should be amended to provide an intent standard of knows or reasonably should
know, which is defined in the Model Rules as denoting "that a lawyer of reasonable
prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question."163 This rec-
ommendation should be adopted wholly apart from the question of whether dis-
closure to prevent crime and fraud is permissive or mandatory
I prefer the stronger position of the ABA Preliminary Report on mandatory
disclosure in certain instances,164 but would be delighted if ABA support for either
proposal would lead the ten holdout jurisdictions (including California, Delaware,
and District of Columbia) to adopt a crime-fraud exception to confidentiality1 61
159. Id.
160. Id. at 206.
161. Id. at 207.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. The text of the ABA Task Force's preliminary recommendation concerning Rule 1.6 reads as
follows:
Extend permissible disclosure under Rule 1.6 to reach conduct that has resulted or is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another as recom-
mended by the Ethics 2000 Commission], and [in addition] require disclosure under Rule 1.6
to prevent felonies or other serious crimes, including violations of the federal securities laws,
where such misconduct is known to the lawyer.
Id. at 214.
165. In California, despite many assertions that the duty of confidentiality is "absolute," the law is
unclear. In the few states that have followed Rule 1.6 as recommended by the ABA (such as Delaware),
a "noisy withdrawal" is permitted when the lawyer has issued an opinion or other document that may
be withdrawn, providing a lawyer with an indirect opportunity to disclose confidential information.
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The more moderate permissive measure may have a better chance of adoption at
the state level.
Keeping a client's secrets is among the most important duties of a lawyer-a
sacred trust. But the duty is not and has never been an absolute one. Historically,
and in the vast majority of American states, the duty of confidentiality evaporates
when a client abuses the attorney-client relationship by using the lawyer's ser-
vices to further criminal or fraudulent activity. Disclosure to prevent future client
fraud on a third person or rectify a past one involving use of the lawyer's services
reflects the historic position of the legal profession, the prevailing rule in most
states, and properly balances the lawyer's duty to client with responsibilities
owed to third persons and the public. The same principle limits the attorney-
client privilege, which evaporates when the client is using the lawyer's services
to further a crime or fraud. Moreover, it is shamelessly inconsistent for the
profession to permit lawyers to disclose information to protect their own finan-
cial interests (e.g., collect a fee) while prohibiting them from doing so when
clients, abusing the relationship, are defrauding third parties. The growing bal-
kanization of American ethics rules would be stemmed by universal adoption
of a single rule on this critical subject, which is vital to public trust in the legal
profession's integrity and public responsibility
Adoption by the states of an ethics rule requiring a lawyer for an organization to
inform the organization's highest authority of the organization's pending or ongoing
involvement in illegal conduct. As a general matter, the power to direct the man-
agement of the business and affairs of a corporation or other organization is vested
in the board of directors, who can be held personally liable to the corporation for
failing to prevent illegal conduct by the corporation's agents. 166 Given the potential
risks to the corporation and to those responsible for its management, a lawyer
should inform senior officers of the corporation of illegal acts for which the cor-
poration could be held responsible. If those officers fail to take appropriate pre-
ventive measures, the lawyer should report the matter to the board of directors
or to an appropriate organ of the board, for example, the outside directors or the
audit committee. This course of conduct may be mandated by corporate law and
is permissible under Model Rule 1.13. Moreover, as Richard Painter has said,
"informing a client about the client's past or future violations of the law goes to
the heart of the purpose of legal representation."'1 7 Consequently, lawyers should
be required to climb the corporate ladder to protect the corporation from harm
caused by its wrongdoing agents.
Model Rule 1.13, which is generally included in state ethics codes, should be
amended in each state to require that a lawyer representing an organization report
a prospective or ongoing illegal act that is likely to be committed by the organi-
zation or one of its agents to the board of directors or other highest authority
authorized to act on behalf of the organization, once the appropriate official within
the organization has been informed of the illegal act and has failed to take
166. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
167. Painter, supra note 63, at 10.
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preventive measure. 63 Corporations would thus be provided greater protection
and corporate directors would be given the information they need to protect
themselves from personal liability The proposed rule would also provide guidance
to lawyers as to how, in a difficult situation, to uphold both the law and the entity
client's interest.
In revising current Rule 1.13, the ABA and state high courts should give high
priority to providing lawyers with language and substance that mirror the require-
ments the SEC will have in place in January 2003. Lawyers should not be faced
with conflicting obligations even though the Supremacy Clause demands that the
federal one be respected. Maximum guidance will come from national uniformity
CONCLUSION
The stunning collapse of Enron, coupled with the large number of accounting
irregularities and apparent corporate fraud, have created a climate in which reform
and improvement of the law governing corporate lawyers is underway The ABA
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility has issued a preliminary report that rec-
ommends promising changes in the rules of professional conduct. And, the Cor-
porate Reform Act of 2002 has changed the landscape by authorizing the SEC to
promulgate rules of professional conduct for securities lawyers and directing the
SEC to issue a rule requiring securities lawyers to climb the corporate ladder to
prevent or rectify a securities law violation by the corporation or a breach of
fiduciary duty by a corporate employee. Some other reforms are also needed,
especially a statutory overruling of the Central Bank decision which eliminated
private causes of action for aiding and abetting a securities fraud.
168. See ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 214 (stating the ABA Task Force's recommen-
dations).
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